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Summary 
 
In a democratic welfare state, how should individual judgment be exercised and constrained 
when someone is making decisions on behalf of another who is not considered competent to 
make his or her own decisions? How should we expect individual judgment to work when a 
physician makes a particular claim for just health care on behalf of his or her patient? These 
are the general questions this thesis attempts to answer. As a result of theoretical discussions, 
I outline two frameworks as a basis for new policies to ensure the quality and accountability 
of the discretionary decisions called for in these circumstances. 
 
The first framework I propose challenges a well established procedure for surrogate decision-
making. Personal autonomy is a concept of self-governance that concern individuals’ ability 
to set ends for themselves and to choose their acts according to their aims and values. The 
practice of requiring informed consent is closely connected to this version of autonomy as it is 
a way of respecting individuals and their ability to decide for themselves. From this point of 
view, a logically organised sequence of events follows: we are considered competent to make 
our own decisions until this competence is doubted by someone else, we then might have our 
competence considered and may potentially be assessed as not competent to make certain 
decisions about our own well-being. Then surrogate(s) will be appointed to make the 
decisions on our behalf. This sequence of events allows for exploitation in a way that could be 
avoided. Moreover, as I have tried to clarify, this sequence of events allows for what I have 
called ‘structural arbitrariness’ in how potentially not competent vulnerable people are 
treated: 1) it is up to others to initiate an assessment of competence, potentially for more or 
less arbitrary reasons, 2) it is up to others to proceed with an assessment process that I have 
shown relies on individual variables which can influence the arbitrariness of the outcome. To 
this we have to add the possibility that: 3) if a person is found by an assessment to be non-
competent, he or she is deprived of credibility and is prevented from correcting or appealing 
on the presumption he or she does not understand his or her best interest. Since treating 
vulnerable people arbitrarily cannot be seen as a respectful way of treating others, I suggest a 
procedure to ensure reasonableness in the decision-making process by involving several 
people other than just the appointed surrogate(s). This process is supposed to safeguard 
against exploitation and against insufficiently justified decisions made on behalf of those 
assessed not competent to make their own decisions. 
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The second framework I suggest uses a novel way of thinking about the relation between 
macro- and micro-level decision-making in terms of legitimacy. There has been much 
discussion about how to obtain legitimacy at macro-level priority setting in health care by 
using fair procedures. Despite the fact that just health care totally hinges on the decisions of 
individual clinicians or health workers at the micro-level, surprisingly little attention seems to 
be paid to the legitimacy of these decisions. Assuming that guidelines are legitimate, what are 
the conditions that have to be met in order to ensure that individual claims on health care are 
aligned with an overall concept of just health care? I argue that macro- and micro-level 
decision-making belong to different contexts of legitimacy so that legitimacy does not 
automatically transfer from legitimate guidelines to individual clinical decisions. Using 
considerations about the relation between authorised discretion and regulating guidelines in 
terms of horizontal and vertical equity, I suggest conditions that have to be met in order for 
micro-level distribution of health care to be legitimate and fair. These conditions add up to a 
framework for reasonable clinical judgments. In addition, this framework also addresses and 
incorporates theoretical conditions affecting clinicians’ motivation to meet the requirement of 
fairness in distribution. I argue that the proposed framework must be taken as a supplement to 
a framework that has legitimate guidelines at the macro-level, and that macro- and micro-
level frameworks must work together to ensure fair distribution within a just health care 
system. 
 
This thesis is organised along an important line of reasoning: Both surrogate decisions and 
distribution of health care at the clinical level are based on delegated discretion.  Certain 
normative constraints are thereby passed onto the individual judgments of surrogates and 
clinicians. I approach these constraints by two different epistemological strategies. On the one 
hand, in the articles which form the basis of this thesis, I argue in favour of the mentioned 
normative frameworks mentioned above. The arguments provided here in crucial ways seek 
support by appealing to intuitions; intuitions about respectful treatment of other people and 
intuitions about equity, according to each framework respectively. On the other hand, I have 
followed another structure of argumentation in the Introduction part of the thesis. I have 
approached the specific topics of this thesis by considering how, in general, the normative 
constraints on delegated discretion are linked to principles derived from moral, personal and 
political versions of autonomy. These concepts are taken to represent central values of a 
democratic welfare state. The frameworks I propose are shown to be substantive realisations 
of these general conditions for exercising discretionary judgment. They are accounted for by 
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appealing to political theory and social values. In this way, I have tried to clarify the project I 
originally categorised as ‘bioethics’ by looking at its inherent political structure as well. I 
consider the two-way justification of the suggested frameworks to strengthen the results of the 
theoretical discussions provided in this thesis. 
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Preliminary remarks  
 
My work on this thesis started with the assumption that I would discuss ethical concerns 
within the field of medical ethics. I was prepared to set out my arguments within the 
framework of well-established doctrines of patient autonomy and ‘state of the art’ clinical 
practice. However, I realised that I would also have to look outside this field to find 
theoretical resources to articulate and justify my intuitions. After attending a course on 
Theories about Professions at Høgskolen i Oslo, I gained an outside-in perspective on the 
medical profession and was inclined to differentiate the power structure from the ethical 
regulation of clinical practice. At the same time, I attended a Priority-setting group led by my 
supervisor Professor Ole Frithjof Norheim. Here, I gained knowledge about macro-level 
approaches to the just distribution of health care. This made me realise that the normative 
aspects of physicians’ clinical judgments cannot be properly understood without going into 
the relationship between macro- and micro-level decision-making.  
 
At this time, however, I was not aware of the call for broadening the field of bioethics to 
reflect the normative implications of the huge body of literature on social determinants within 
the field of epidemiology. So I wrote about reasonable clinical judgment and supposedly 
legitimate clinical guidelines using an argumentation which stretched and partly adopted 
political theory in order to widen the frame of justification. My argument in support of 
maintaining professional discretion was based on intuitions about fairness. I tested this 
argument by appealing to constructed examples demonstrating the need for improving the 
conditions for those worst-off. Then, when I recognised that inequity in health should not be 
considered to be isolated cases of bad luck but rather more directly related to issues of social 
justice, I realised I needed to place the argumentation into a wider framework of political 
philosophy and political theory than that initially set out in the field of medical ethics. 
 
I had a similar experience working on my other topic, patient autonomy and care for people 
who lack decision-making competence. I started out with a strong intuition that there is 
something wrong or insufficient about the way decision-making on behalf of incompetent 
individuals is justified. I soon felt trapped within the frameworks or doctrines which 
traditionally appear in the field of medical ethics. I needed an outside-in perspective on the 
political values which underlie the practice of promoting patient’s autonomy. I then realised 
that my intuitions about the problem were related to the way ‘promoting the patient’s 
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autonomy’ only mediated a disconnected part of the political values in our society. In order to 
support my arguments for a new type of surrogate decision-making, I needed to place the 
issue into a wider framework of political philosophical justification.  This was too large an 
issue for a single article. 
 
For these reasons, the Introduction to this dissertation plays a more important role than just 
providing a sketch of the background for my papers. It should rather be read as part of the 
whole argumentative structure leading towards the practical suggestions of my papers. While 
the papers represent arguments structured partly from the context of clinical practice, this 
introduction provides an outside-in, theoretical approach to the issues of individual 
discretionary judgment within an organised state. I try to clarify the bioethical approaches by 
referring to political philosophy and theory.  I hope these different approaches to the topics in 
this thesis are not only compatible, but also in a deeper sense confirm each other when they 
are considered as parts of a greater justification process. To support this overall 
epistemological point of view on the thesis, I have included some meta-methodological 
considerations of bioethics as a separate section within the introduction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
PART I: BACKGROUND 
A democratic welfare state: normative presumptions  
In a democratic welfare state, how should individual judgment be exercised and constrained 
when someone is making decisions on behalf of another who is not considered competent to 
make his or her own decisions? How should we expect individual judgment to work when a 
physician makes a particular claim for just health care on behalf of his or her patient? These 
are the general questions this thesis attempts to answer. 
 
This introduction is organised as follows. I will start by clarifying the kind of state within 
which individual judgment is assumed to be exercised, that is, a democratic welfare state. 
Against this background, I outline the two particular topics for this thesis. I then provide a 
general framework for the normative regulations which are imposed on individual judgment 
when it is exercised by individuals trusted with discretionary powers within the structure of a 
democratic welfare state. These regulations concern people entrusted to make surrogate 
decisions on behalf of people who are assessed as incompetent to make their own decisions 
and physicians who are entrusted to make claims for health care on behalf of their patients. 
Apart from these shared meta-regulations, the contexts for exercising judgment as surrogates 
or physicians are quite different from each other. I therefore continue to account for these 
contexts separately, by presenting distinct frameworks. 
 
Welfare state 
A welfare state has been described as “a state that ensures individuals life, health and welfare 
by a system consisting of (1) social rights provided to the citizens by virtue of their 
citizenship, (2) distribution of resources according to social goals (health, education, 
insurance, social security, childcare, etc.), 3) institutions and officials, especially 
professionals, who promote the rights of the citizens and carry political decisions into effect 
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[the author’s translation] (Eriksen 2001, pp 12-13). Historically, states develop by different 
organisations and movements driven by diverse motives. Welfare states may present 
themselves in various forms. In the following, my concern is not to highlight a certain kind of 
a welfare state but rather to draw attention to some basic values on which modern states are 
organised in general terms. I suggest a combination of values which may be considered to 
constitute modern, democratic welfare states. 
 
Moral autonomy 
Crucial for the organisation of a welfare state is normative regulation based on the idea of the 
equal moral standing of all individuals. This calls for respectful treatment of every human 
being. This idea can be explained in terms of Kant’s concept of moral autonomy (Kant 2002). 
The core meaning of ‘autonomy’ is usually understood as some form of ‘self-governance’, 
self-regulation, or self-direction (Paul, Miller Jr. et al. 2003). Kant’s theory about how our 
practical reason is constrained by the categorical imperative is an account of our individual 
appreciation of moral rights and obligations. The categorical imperative is considered to be a 
universal law formulated as two directives. On the one hand, the law demands that we treat 
other people as ends in themselves and not only as means to an end. On the other hand, the 
law dictates that we shall only act in ways that we would wish to become a universal law. 
Moral autonomy constitutes human dignity as humans can be seen as both the ‘authors’ of and 
the obedient subjects of the self-imposed moral law. In this respect people are considered to 
be free and equal individuals. 
 
Individuals are not only considered free to impose universal laws upon their own actions, 
thereby fulfilling their moral autonomy. They can also be considered free in the sense of 
possessing individual autonomy. Individual autonomy does not require any objective end for 
all of our actions and for any rational being. Rather, individual autonomy characterises the 
individual’s general capacity to set ends for themselves in accordance with their subjective 
desires, and to pursue these ends by appropriate means according to what Kant called 
hypothetical imperatives. Individual autonomy allows individuals to plan their lives according 
to motives and reasons that are their own in the sense of not being externally manipulated or 
forced upon the individual. This freedom was emphasised by John Stuart Mill in his 
influential work on utilitarian liberalism (Mill 1998). Mill’s concern about individual freedom 
was related to its role in the development of personal character, its contribution to cultivating 
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appropriate feelings and thus its contribution to forming the well-developed human being. 
This development was considered to be grounded in the basic interest of man as ‘a 
progressive being’. Mill’s attempt to give a naturalistic account for normative constraints on 
individual moral development in psychological terms sees individual autonomy as existing 
prior to morality. This results in a naturalistic upside down version of how Kant considered 
the relation between autonomy (freedom) and reason in his metaphysical account for the pre-
conditions for mortality.  
 
Personal autonomy 
Recent accounts of individual autonomy mainly seem to follow the naturalistic version 
vindicated by Mill. The role of freedom in self-governance is to self-reflect critically on one’s 
desires, decide on one’s own goals and make choices in accordance with one’s own plans and 
conceptions of the good in the absence of external control (Dworkin 1988; Frankfurt 1988). In 
this way, individual autonomy becomes a character ideal (Gaus 2005). We can distinguish this 
version of individual autonomy from Kant’s moral version by calling it personal autonomy. 
Recent versions of personal autonomy explain freedom in terms of first and higher orders of 
desires, the choice between which forms the character and motivates actions (Taylor 2005). 
These versions of autonomy are not solely aimed at explaining moral responsibility, although 
they attempt to account for how the fundamental idea of individual responsibility links with 
autonomy in general. 
 
Against this background, we can see that considering autonomy from a moral point of view 
implies an individual responsibility for the respectful treatment of others. Respectful 
treatment, understood as the realisation of the duty to treat others as ends in themselves, 
involves respecting an individual’s ability to set subjective ends for themselves, allowing 
them to form who they are and what they value (and thereby enacting their personal 
autonomy). Moreover, treating others as ends in themselves also involves the obligation of 
helping those who cannot help themselves. Let us see how the structure of moral autonomy 
forms the basis for the organisation of a modern state of citizens. 
 
From a political perspective, the fundamental characteristics of individuals as moral equals 
with the freedom to set their own goals also applies to the concept of citizens. Modern, 
political, social contract theories reproduce the structure of moral autonomy when describing 
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the relationship between the state and the citizens. According to the influential work of J. 
Rawls, people are seen to subject themselves freely to the governing power of the state, which 
represents the collective power of equal citizens (Rawls 1993). In this way, individuals are 
aggregated into the unifying term people, who freely constrain their own actions by the 
regulations they impose upon themselves as duties mediated by the state. 
 
The core tasks for states, organised in accordance with citizens’ self-imposed regulations, are 
to administrate the distribution of social goods such as education, health care and protection 
and to ensure that the distribution is just. A state structured like this can organise just 
distribution in many different ways depending on substantive views about distributive justice. 
As the citizens are expected to subject themselves freely to the state power, the basic political 
institutions which ensure distribution of social goods according to rights and duties must be 
based on fair principles. Fair principles are principles that would be accepted by everyone 
affected by them. The substantive content of principles for fair distribution of social goods, 
however, is widely discussed (Rawls 1971; Daniels 1985; Frankfurt 1987; Arneson 1989; 
Cohen 1989; Dworkin 2000; Sen 2006). 
In a modern state, the state’s distribution of goods is typically structured and institutionalised 
as the state’s obligations towards the people and the corresponding rights and duties of the 
citizens. In this way, citizens are respected and their autonomy maintained by rights that give 
them freedom to pursue their own ends. However, state administrations ensuring citizens their 
rights can be organised to respect the autonomy of citizens in different ways. Let us consider 
two general models of distribution to see how this can be so. 
 
Models for distribution according to versions of autonomy 
Equal concern, considered the sovereign virtue of political community, can very generally be 
interpreted in two distinct ways (Dworkin 2000). These ways can be captured by the question 
“What does it mean to respect people as moral equals?” As one answer, we can imagine a 
society where fair distribution is understood in general as a kind of distribution that provides 
every citizen with rights to make exactly the same claims on the common resources. This type 
of distribution could be aligned with the idea of personal autonomy. It could be considered 
fair to distribute an equal share of the good to everyone and then leave it up to each individual 
to make the best of their opportunities. Given that there are huge variations in the initial 
conditions in which individuals find themselves, this distribution would be expected to result 
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in great inequality between people with regard to how successfully they pursue their own 
ends. Still, the organised distribution can be said to allow for, and even protect, the personal 
autonomy of individuals. But can this type of distribution be seen as treating individuals as 
ends in themselves, understood as the other version of respecting people as moral equals 
accounted for above?  
 
Let us consider the other model of distribution where the rights of people do not involve 
getting exactly the same share of resources, but rather the aim is to achieve equality in the 
outcomes of resource use. According to this model, distribution should allow unequal shares 
of resources to make up for the initial disadvantaged conditions. This model allows for 
redistribution in accordance with individual needs (generally understood).  
 
These two, very abstract and schematic ways of considering the alternatives for distribution 
that respect equality, leave us with a trade-off. If distribution does not correct for initial 
conditions which individuals cannot be expected to control, then the distribution does not 
represent an equal opportunity for everyone. Thus, the distribution that ensures equality in 
resources discriminates between citizens and gives them unequal potential for realising their 
ends. This means they are treated as ends in themselves to an unequal degree. On the other 
hand, ensuring that everyone is treated as an end in themselves implies compensating for the 
conditions that prevent some people from the opportunity of reaching their ends. This would 
discriminate between people in the sense that resources are not distributed equally. The two 
different ways of understanding ‘equal concern’ in distribution, and the two distinct 
distributive strategies which result from this ambiguity, both undermine one of the aspects of 
respectful treatment of moral equals inherent in the concept of moral autonomy. 
 
This crude distinction between putting weight on the welfare outcome on one side and 
equality in distribution of resources on the other corresponds to two different versions of 
egalitarianism, equality in welfare and equality in resources. Philosophical approaches have 
attempted to combine these models, for example, by an idea of equal opportunity for welfare 
(Arneson 1989). Others have explicitly stated that they support resource-egalitarianism  
(Rawls 1999; Dworkin 2000). 
 
Given the description of a welfare state above, we can start to flesh out the versions of 
autonomy the organisation of such a state might support. In this description, securing social 
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rights rather than promoting rights to an equal claim on resources was emphasised. This 
welfare state is characterised by its effort to ensure basic social conditions for all its citizens. 
Welfare is favoured at the expense of equal distribution of resources. This welfare state is 
based on the idea that people are considered moral equals, which here implies that people are 
to be treated as ends in themselves. Furthermore, it follows that an ideal welfare state would 
also allow people to exercise personal autonomy by the way it treats people as an end in 
themselves. This means the state must allow people opportunities to enact their personal 
autonomy by protecting them from coercion. Moreover, treating others as ends in themselves 
is also generally considered to involve an obligation to protect the interests of the vulnerable 
and thereby help those who cannot help themselves (Goodin 1985). So the concept of a 
welfare state must involve more than an aggregation of individually achieved welfare, since it 
must also encompass a duty to maintain the welfare of the vulnerable. An ideal welfare state 
must be organised to balance both the demand of treating people as moral equals in the sense 
of treating them as ends in themselves by providing opportunities and protect against harm (as 
one aspect of moral autonomy) and the demand of allowing individuals to set and pursue their 
own aims (personal autonomy). This is what I take ‘welfare state’ to mean in the following.  
 
As democracy is also integrated into a welfare state, there is a third version of autonomy we 
will need to bear in mind. 
  
Political autonomy  
Contractual theories allow us to see how a welfare state is connected to the idea of 
democracy. When the power of the state is organised so as to realise rule by the people, the 
state constitution can be described as a democracy (Held 1987). Democracy, then, is broadly 
understood as the collective power of the citizens maintaining the state through free 
endorsement. There are various ways to characterise democratic processes resulting in 
different constitutional regimes (Gutman 1993). In very general terms, we might say that in a 
real democracy, there will be freely running public debates within the state about how the 
constitution might be improved in terms of its democracy. 
 
Clearly, in order to realise democracy, citizens must possess individual autonomy in the sense 
that they are free from external forces or constraints upon their actions. This corresponds to 
negative, political freedom characterised as the absence of coercion on individuals’ or 
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collective’s actions (Berlin 2006). But a positive reading of the freedom presupposed by 
autonomy is also needed when we consider the preconditions for democracy. When someone 
acts according to the principles articulated in the categorical imperative, positive freedom is 
seen in the autonomously imposed constraints on one’s actions. So the Kantian version of 
moral autonomy mirrors the idea of positive freedom in that reason is applied to reason itself 
in order to disclose universal principles. When people are seen in a political way, there is 
more to individual responsibility than defining and realising one’s own conceptions of a good 
life in the light of higher-order desires. In order to realise a democracy based on the collective 
power of the citizens, the basic institutions of the state require recognition of the need for 
fairness. (Rawls 1993) Just as recognition of universal principles (Kant’s moral autonomy) or 
higher-order desire (personal autonomy) constrains truly autonomous actions in an ethical 
perspective; recognition of the requirements of fairness truly constrains autonomous political 
actions within a constitutional democracy. We can refer to this as political autonomy. Political 
autonomy concerns citizens as they recognise the need for fairness in the basic institutions of 
the state in the same way as they freely subject themselves to the principles of fairness in their 
individual actions. According to the concept of a welfare state, such principles have to be 
compatible with the interpretation of people as moral equals implying they are to be treated as 
ends in themselves. This means that citizens living in a democratic welfare state have 
institutionalised rights to receive treatment according to their relevant individual needs 
(whatever fair principles suggest these to be) and these rights are equally distributed among 
all citizens. 
 
Basic principles for a democratic welfare state 
Against this background, a democratic welfare state, as understood in this thesis presupposes 
the following ideal principles based upon our different interpretations of autonomy: 
 
I) The state has a duty to respect all humans as moral equals, to treat them equally by 
distributing social goods in accordance with citizens rights and to redistribute 
social goods according to relevant needs (moral autonomy) 
II) The state must allow individuals freedom to a) reflect upon, adopt and endorse 
their own ends and b) make their own decisions concerning their own lives in 
accordance with their own values (personal autonomy) 
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III) Citizens, when involved in developing political principles for distributive 
institutions, are subject to requirements of fairness when reflecting and endorsing 
ends for their actions (political autonomy) 
 
These principles will serve as the general framework within which individual judgment is 
used to assess individual needs. I have striven to formulate these ideals broadly enough to be 
uncontroversial and to allow for various interpretations.  But I also hope they are narrow and 
substantive enough to allow the discovery of any internal tensions between them. This is not 
meant as an exhaustive list of principles needed for a successful democratic welfare state. 
However, I see these three principles as sufficient to frame the particular issues I wish to 
discuss in this thesis.  
 
Theoretical discourse is occupied with principled ways of interpreting the conditions and the 
ambiguity of such ideals. Practical, political discourse can be seen driven by disagreement 
about the substantive content and practical consequences of these kinds of ideals. When 
institutions are developed to support a democratic welfare state, considerations must be made 
to avoid bringing these principles into conflict with each other undermining the superior 
intentions. This idea has formed the basis of individual papers in this thesis where I discuss 
two specific contexts within the structure of a democratic welfare state where individual 
judgment is exercised. More precisely, I consider two different practices which, in their 
current form, address tensions between the ideal principles of democratic welfare states. 
These practices are: 
i) surrogate decision-making on behalf on individuals who are assessed as not competent to 
make their own decisions, and ii) discretionary judgments concerning the just distribution of 
health care in clinical settings. 
 
Outline of the topics  
A democratic welfare state cannot be represented by institutions which promote paternalistic 
decisions when meeting the individual needs of the citizens. Paternalism has been 
characterised as “the intentional overriding of one person’s known preferences or actions by 
another person, where the person who overrides justifies the action by the goal of benefiting 
or avoiding harm to the person whose preferences or actions are overridden” (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2001, p 178). Paternalistic actions would undermine one of the basic ideals of a 
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democratic welfare state, namely personal autonomy as described in principle II. But it would 
also undermine the first principles about respectful treatment of moral equals; individuals are 
respected by being treated as ends in themselves and this must involve considering individuals 
to have the primary basis for recognising their own best interests.  
 
The need to respect personal autonomy in health care is fulfilled by requiring informed 
consent when the patient is to receive treatment or be involved in a clinical trial. However, it 
has been much debated whether this actually works according to the intention. It is not 
obvious what informed consent actually consists of, because there is no conclusive definition 
of what personal autonomy is (Faden and Beauchamp 1986; Christman 1988; Dworkin 1988; 
O'Neill 2003). There is, therefore, no obvious way to decide when a person is competent to 
make autonomous choices (Drane 1985; Beauchamp and Childress 2001; Buller 2001; 
DeMarco 2002; Kim, Karlawish et al. 2002; Buchanan 2004; Moye, Gurrera et al. 2006; 
Appelbaum 2007)It is also unclear how informed consent and patient autonomy as theories 
actually capture how patient autonomy is integrated in real-life practice (Pellegrino 1994; 
Schneider 1998; O'Neill 2002; Tauber 2003; Struhkamp 2005). Furthermore, it is not obvious 
that leaving patients with the responsibility for making the decisions is necessarily a 
respectful way to treat patients (Quill and Brody 1996; Beach, Duggan et al. 2007). All of 
these issues show us that patient autonomy is not a simple concept. A well justified 
understanding of patient autonomy has to address all these theoretical and practical concerns.  
 
It is possible to trace an influential doctrine of patient autonomy based on the work of 
Beauchamp and Childress (Beauchamp and Childress 2001; Beauchamp 2003; Gillon 2003). 
This concept is most usefully seen as a doctrine of ideals and practical solutions addressing 
the various aspects of exercising, or failing to exercise, personal autonomy in health care. The 
ideals of treating competent individuals, assessing competence and treating those who lack 
competence are connected. The doctrine provides us with an organised way of handling 
personal autonomy issues sequentially from the point where the clinician starts to doubt a 
patient’s capacity to exercise this right. The sequence of events is as follows. Normally, an 
individual’s capacity to make their own decisions about their own welfare is taken for granted 
(Buchanan and Brock 1990). If this capacity has come into doubt for some reason, the 
decision-making competence is (should be) assessed formally. If the person is found to be not 
competent, a guardian might be appointed by the court, or informally, it might be left to a 
proxy (proxies) or health care personnel to make decisions on behalf of the incompetent 
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person. Whether the appointment of a surrogate is formal or informal, it can be a heavy 
responsibility and challenges the surrogate’s individual judgment to work out what would be 
the right thing to do. 
 
In this thesis, I question whether current practices for treating those assessed not competent is 
really in line with the principles we established above as a basic requirement for a democratic 
welfare state. The whole process of doubting an individual’s competence, assessing their 
competence and making surrogate decisions on their behalf can be seen as arbitrary in a 
fundamental way, which allows the possibility of exploitation and manipulation. Is it 
respectful to treat the most vulnerable people in an arbitrary way, when they cannot, as a 
result of the assessment, defend themselves and their preferences to those who consider them 
incompetent? This dilemma is inherent to the established way of respecting individual 
autonomy as it is practised around the world in modern liberal societies, but it might not be 
compatible with the requirement of respectful treatment of all human beings, including the 
most vulnerable.  
 
With regard to just health care in a democratic welfare state, the involvement of individual 
judgment relates to a wide range of issues. Central to thesis is the individual judgment of 
clinicians presented as ‘clinical judgment’. This term is used in rather ambiguous ways. It is 
used to describe the reasoning constituting the practice of medicine as art, science or a 
compounding of the both (Gorovitz and MacIntyre 1975; Widdershoven-Heerding 1987; 
Pellegrino and Thomasma 1993; Eddy 1996; Davis 1997; Kenny 1997). Clinical judgment, 
considered one way or another as an essential part of medical practice has an important role to 
play in several challenging issues that have to be dealt with within a health care system. These 
issues concern clinical autonomy and trust placed in physicians (Hall and Berenson 1998; 
Bloche 1999), confidence placed in the distribution by the profession of medicine and the 
derived request for accountability of the medical practice (Mechanic 1996; Pellegrino and 
Relman 1999; Cruess, Cruess et al. 2000), the quality of care in relation to evidence based 
medicine (Hurwitz 1999; Hampton 2002; Parker 2005), the political implications of allowing 
physicians’ extensive discretionary authority (Klein 1998; Lauridsen 2008) and the role of the 
physicians in call for rationing (Mechanic 1992; Hunter 1995; Pellegrino 1997; Kassirer 
1998; Ubel and Goold 1998; Mechanic 2000; Ubel 2001; Hurst and Danis 2007). 
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My concern about physicians’ individual judgment is how their delegated discretion can 
affect just distribution of health care, how their judgment can and should be regulated under 
the requirement of fairness within a closed system of distribution and redistribution (Daniels 
1987). Just distributions have been extensively dealt with at an aggregated level of health care 
needs (Daniels 1985; Statens offentliga utredningar 1993; Norges Offentlige Utredninger 
1997; Cookson and Dolan 2000; Daniels 2007). Fair distribution considered on an aggregated 
level has been taken as ensuring equitable distribution at the individual level by imposed 
guidelines (Rawlins and Culyer 2004). Moreover, the issue of legitimacy has been brought 
into the process of developing guidelines by making the actual process accountable (Norheim 
1999). Others have tried to incorporate issues of equity into guidelines (Aldrich, Kemp et al. 
2003; Oxman, Schunemann et al. 2006; Dans, Dans et al. 2007). I question this transfer of 
justice from one context of justification to another; from a context of aggregated needs to the 
context of individual needs by compliance with guidelines. I also question whether guidelines 
or rules are able to promote the aspects of justice that calls for unlike treatment of cases that 
are unlike in relevant respect. I ask what is needed to justify the individual clinical judgment 
when rules or guidelines alone cannot do the job of promoting justice. In this case, individual 
efforts to achieve just distribution must be in accordance with the three principles set out 
above as characterising a state of both welfare and democracy. The practical solutions I will 
suggest will have to address the theoretical and practical challenges involved when individual 
judgment needs to focus on particular needs and at the same time to promote democracy by 
acting on what would be considered fair but without expectations that everyone enacting their 
personal autonomy will come up with the same answer to what should be considered as fair.  
 
There are gaps in the literature with regard to the meta-regulations imposed on individual 
judgment when it is exercised as delegated discretion within the framework of a democratic 
welfare state. In this thesis I explore how individual judgment is constrained and how it 
should be exercised when surrogates make decisions on behalf of individuals who are 
assessed not competent to make their own decisions and when physicians make particular 
claims to fair health care on behalf of their patients.   
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PART II: FRAMEWORKS 
 
GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
In this section, I will consider in more detail the structural constraints imposed on individual 
judgment within a democratic welfare state by stressing the crucial distinction between 
‘discretion’ and ‘judgment’ and by explaining the link between these concepts. This 
discussion about the formal constraints on individual judgment forms a shared framework for 
the specific topics I discuss in the articles. I will then look specifically at each of the two areas 
I have considered: surrogate decision making and just claims on health care.  
 
Judgment versus discretion 
Individual judgment, when it is exercised within institutions designed to sustain the ideals of a 
democratic welfare state, is subject to formal constraints.  It is important to clarify the 
distinction between ‘epistemic judgment’ and ‘structural discretion’ (Grimen and Molander 
2008) (in Norwegian: ‘epistemisk skjønn’ and ‘strukturelt skjønn’.) ‘Judgment’ is relevant 
when we assess an act without determinate standards, when we are trying to discern the right 
from the wrong thing to do or decide what is valuable art and what is uninteresting and so 
forth. Exercising judgment is considered to be an epistemic activity. ‘Discretion’, on the other 
hand is visualised as ‘the hole in a doughnut’ by R. Dworkin and ‘a lacuna in a system of 
rules’ by R. Goodin, suggesting an empty space for unconstrained decision-making compared 
to the surrounding space of constraining regulation which usually determines the outcome of 
decisions (Dworkin 1978; Goodin 1986). The open space represents the relative freedom of 
being able to choose how to act or being able to assess a situation using one’s own 
justification in the absence of pre-determined standards. Dworkin stresses that this 
understanding of discretion presupposes that decisions are normally subject to restrictions 
settled by authorities other than the agent himself. He also distinguishes between ‘weak’ and 
‘strong’ discretion. The weak version of discretion represents the kind of individual judgment 
that is at work whenever someone tries to apply general knowledge (or standards) to 
particular instances. This version of discretion also operates when there is no-one reviewing 
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the decisions. The strong version of discretion is present when there are no standards to 
determine the decisions so the individual decision-maker can rely completely on his own, 
independent standards of justification. However, as Goodin pointed out, it will not make sense 
to state that in such a case there is no rule at all. Discretion presupposes a ‘meta-rule’ 
indicating the objective of the decision to be made. This could be a need or someone’s best 
interest. ‘Discretion’ does not describe judgment in contexts where an individual is supposed 
to decide freely, such as the colour of one’s own bathroom. In this sense, discretion can be 
seen as already regulated in some way by another authority. This also makes sense if we see a 
decision-maker as ‘empowered with discretion’, which would, of course, be a strange way to 
describe someone choosing the colour for decorating their walls. 
Goodin, who is occupied with discretion in relation to the distribution of social goods in a 
welfare state, provides a more detailed analysis than Dworkin of various kinds of discretion. 
According to Goodin, the discretion an individual possesses can be categorised into different 
types depending on whether the decisions are constrained by rules, how binding any rules are 
and whether the individual’s decision is likely to be reviewed or potentially overturned by any 
other official. In general, however, discretion must be related to the fact that it is delegated 
and not ‘given’. ‘Discretion’ denotes delegated authority relative to other authorities.  
”Logically, the opposite of enjoying discretion is being bound by a rule” writes Goodin 
(Goodin 1986, p 250). At the same time, he stresses that discretion arises in two ways, even 
when a decision is bound by rules. First, discretion is needed in order to choose the rule that 
the specific context requires. Someone must have the authority to make that choice where 
there are different rules to consider. Second, discretion is also involved ”in the act of bringing 
particular cases under the ambit of general rules” (Goodin 1986, p 238). This means that 
when an authority has decided on a general rule, discretion is needed to identify the cases this 
general rule applies to. Discretion is at work even in a system of rules, so rules cannot totally 
undermine discretion.  
 
Being empowered with the discretion to make certain kinds of decisions gives the decision-
maker power. This power can represent a threat in so far as it could be misused to manipulate 
or exploited others. Misuse can be prevented at one level by having decisions reviewed by 
another, superior, authority. But as Goodin has pointed out, the review process has to end 
somewhere (Goodin 1986). So the threat of misuse is not eliminated but may just be 
transferred further up the hierarchy of authority. 
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In a democratic welfare state, bureaucrats typically prepare and translate political aims into 
practice on behalf of the state. The state is, however, in accordance with democratic theory, to 
be considered as a representation of the power of the people (Held 1987). Legislation and 
policies which regulate the distribution of common goods are usually voted through by 
elected representatives, or sometimes directly by the citizens. Principles supporting 
democracy are needed for more than just how to count the votes. These principles also have to 
follow through the whole bureaucratic system in order to support the will of the people in the 
distribution of common goods. Requirements of openness and a clearly structured system of 
authority and responsibility for decision-making is an important way to promote democracy 
(understood as the will of the people) throughout the distribution of social goods.  
 
To sum up: ‘Discretion’ is used to describe the power structure at work when someone makes 
decisions within a state structure of delegated authority and responsibility. ‘Judgment’ on the 
other hand, denotes the epistemological activity of assessing, evaluating and filling out 
indeterminacy in general, and by those empowered with discretion in particular.  
 
Street-level bureaucrats and distribution according to need 
A welfare state can be characterised by the emphasis put on the citizens’ rights that promote 
equality by levelling up the conditions of the worst-off citizens in order to secure everyone a 
certain standard of living. In this respect, states seek to distribute certain social goods in 
accordance with need. At a collective level, this kind of targeted distribution hinges upon 
interpretations of needs, both regarding what kind of goods should be distributed to promote 
equality and more specifically how to measure the need which is to be compensated for. At 
the individual level, the person’s situation is taken into consideration when needs are 
assessed. As part of the process of determining needs, certain characteristics might be 
identified and agreed upon outside the person-specific context. For example, citizens with 
incomes below a certain level are entitled to pay less for their children’s kindergartens than 
those with higher incomes. In such cases, there are clear rules to follow when particular needs 
are considered. However, needs might be composed of various factors that, taken together, 
represent a much more complex picture which is difficult or impossible to capture in rules 
established to determine need. Moreover, to fulfil the aim of compensating for disadvantage 
and inequalities, measuring the compensation needed in the particular case by discretion 
might be the most effective way of reducing the needs. If the aim is equality, reached by 
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compensation, there must be a balance between levelling up the conditions for the worst-off 
without at the same time leaving the rest of society comparably worse-off. Consequently, it is 
not only limited resources that speak against overcompensation of individual needs, but also 
inherent logical constraints in the structure of a welfare state. In order to ensure that any 
compensation is neither too small, nor too large, individual need assessment is necessary. This 
means that someone has to assess individual needs which are not completely predefined by a 
set of specific characteristics, which lead to specific compensation. This assessment is 
fundamentally based on someone’s judgment about the need in the specific case.  
 
The distribution (or ‘redistribution’ as it might be called since social and economic 
compensation in accordance with needs comes in addition to the public distribution of goods 
that all citizens are entitled to within a welfare state) of social goods heavily depends upon the 
judgment of individual officials who face those in need of some kind of help. These officials 
represent the mediating instances between the politically, more or less generally defined needs 
and compensations, and the people who will receive this compensation. In this work, the 
officials have to transform political ideals, rules and particular concerns into concrete claims 
for compensating services. These officials fall under the description ‘street-level bureaucrats’ 
(Lipsky 1980). ‘Street-level bureaucrats’ are defined as ”[P]ublic service workers who 
interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion 
in the execution of their work” (Lipsky 1980, p 3). This definition is wide enough to cover a 
lot of occupations which mediate welfare goods to citizens without necessarily focusing upon 
and determining individual needs in particular. The definition goes for all those who distribute 
common goods such as education and security, provide classroom tuition or preserve law and 
order. But it also goes for those occupied with identifying more specified needs for publicly 
funded compensation such as health care workers. Characteristically, democratic control over 
the discretionary work of street-level bureaucrats is very limited. Their decisions about how to 
distribute welfare are usually not open to public review and it is hard to find ways to make 
street-level bureaucrats accountable for their discretionary work because of the particularity of 
needs they consider. These facts amount to what has been called ‘the black hole of  
democracy’(Eriksen 2001). Although the work of street-level bureaucrats allow for discretion 
to a varying extent depending on the kind of work they do, the following points about the 
relation between discretion and judgment goes for all of them.  
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The relation between judgment and discretion in terms of best calculated 
Goodin writes about discretion: “’Discretion’ admits of two types of characterization, one 
positive and one negative. On the positive characterization, an official can be said to have 
discretion if and only if he is empowered to pursue some social goal(s) in the context of 
individual cases in such a way as he judges to be best calculated, in the circumstances, to 
promote those goals...These two characterizations, one positive and one negative, perhaps 
give a different flavour to discussions of discretion. Formally, however, I take them to be 
extensionally equivalent.” (Goodin 1986, pp 233-234) It is reasonable to see the positive 
description of discretion to fill up the lacuna (according to Goodin’s negative 
characterization), or the hole in the doughnut (Dworkin’s characterization), with 
epistemological activity externally unregulated in the absence of explicit rules. It would not 
be right, however, to conclude that judgment is totally unconstrained. First, according to 
Goodin’s description above, the judging process is normatively constrained by being 
considered the best calculated way to promote the goals in question. Obviously, if this 
normative constraint on the considerations of someone empowered with discretion was 
inherent in exercising discretion, discretion as such would not represent a threat of 
manipulation and exploitation. A more plausible way to link the positive and negative 
description is then not to see them as extensionally equivalent, but to say that when someone 
is empowered with discretion, they are also expected to consider how to promote the actual 
goals in what they judge to be the best calculated way. In the following, we will first consider 
the expectation that someone will promote the goal one judges to be best calculated in terms 
of trust and confidence and then consider what judging something to be best calculated 
actually amounts to in terms of meta-regulations imposed upon judgment.  
 
Trust and confidence 
If a democratic welfare state is to allow this kind of discretion, we must look at the role of 
trust. First, we must distinguish between the collective (or public) and individuals as who give 
trust, and institutions or individuals who are potentially trusted. Second, we must distinguish 
between ‘trust’ and ‘confidence’(Luhmann 1988; Seligman 1997; Checkland, Marshall et al. 
2004; Dibben and Davies 2004; Harrison and Smith 2004). It is argued that ‘confidence’ 
relates to the general sense of safety and reliability that we routinely invest in abstract 
systems”, while ‘trust’ on the other hand, is essentially considered to be a moral issue, and 
 27 
“[T]he moral nature of trust derives from the characteristic involvement of risk (of 
disappointment/damage), vulnerability, individual agency and the absence of regulatory 
mechanisms of coercion. Trust cannot be demanded or forced; it depends upon voluntary 
reciprocity in those interpersonal relations that are not governed by confidence.” (Smith 2001, 
p 295)  
Individuals empowered with discretion within a state structure are potentially subjected to 
both confidence and trust. They can be considered part of a collective entrusted with the 
responsibility for bearing certain institutions. In this regard they could be considered subject 
to confidence rather than trust, according to the distinction above. So, from a political, public 
point of view, delegation of discretion within a state structure must be based on collective 
confidence that those empowered with discretion will exercise judgment and sustain the 
institutions, according to ways they judge to be best calculated. And from a moral point of 
view, when individuals trust other individuals who are empowered with discretion, they trust 
them to be able and willing to judge the best way to respond (Baier 1986; Smith 2001). At the 
same time, confidence and trust also mirror asymmetric relations of power. This becomes 
clear when we recognise that institutions and trusted individuals are in a position to bring 
about actions that are simply not aligned with the moral expectations. There is no guarantee 
that power is always used in the other’s best interest (Grimen 2001).  
Both confidence and trust are fundamental for democracy as they allow individual discretion 
to represent the ‘rule of the people’ and to pervade bureaucracy and the organised distribution 
of rights and common goods. O. O’Neill emphases that trust (and, I add, confidence) enables 
democracy, rather than the other way around (O'Neill 2002). Confidence placed in institutions 
can be weakened. The media plays an important role in reporting on officials’ decision-
making that can undermine confidence. Reports might be biased or even incorrect and can 
lead to a distorted version that challenges the confidence of the citizens (O'Neill 2002). 
Nevertheless, continuous questioning of whether public institutions are worthy of confidence 
can be seen as fundamental in sustaining democracy. This leads us to the requirement of 
accountability. 
 
Accountability 
In order to ensure that humans can develop as free and equal members of democracies, 
coercive powers, and arbitrary power, must be reduced to a minimum. The only way this can 
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happen is to subject the state to accountability (Held 1987). In order to maintain confidence 
(or rebuild it, if lost), there is a need for accountability not only in political decision-making 
processes but also in the institutions involved in the distribution of rights and social goods.  
 
Accountability presupposes that 1) there is someone to be held accountable, 2) that there are 
ways to hold someone accountable and 3) there is someone to whom one is accountable 
(Emanuel and Emanuel 1996). Welfare institutions, represented by collective discretionary 
decision-making, can be accountable to substantial goals that are recognised and accepted. In 
general, accountability presupposes transparency so that all stake-holders are able to judge the 
collective performance in accordance with accessible standards. At the level of welfare 
institutions, accountability can be seen to be related to procedures which measure the outcome 
of discretionary decision-making in terms of objectively measurable standards of 
performance. As regards point 3), the public institution has to answer to stake-holders in the 
distribution system, that is to local management, higher governmental authorities and to the 
public it is supposed to serve. Accountability of institutions, represented by substantive 
standards for the assessment of performance, gives people some ways to evaluate institutions 
and not just leave the attitude as a matter of blind confidence. 
 
What about the accountability of particular discretionary decisions within an organised 
distribution system? First, we must note that the aggregated discretionary decisions of 
individuals can also be subjected to standards of performance, for instance by monitoring the 
rate of referrals of a general practitioner. In this respect, accountability does not concern the 
particular decision but rather the pattern of decision-making which corresponds to the 
accountability of the individuals as part of the organised welfare institution in question.  
 
Individuals who realise the rights of others by their decisions are, of course, subject to 
externally imposed laws and institutionalised procedures which make them accountable for 
their work. When exercising discretion, however, they are not, by definition, subject to any 
accessible rule which explicitly indicates what the given situation requires. This of course, 
does not exclude the possibility that they judge according to internally imposed standards.  
These are standards imposed upon their judgments by the individuals themselves and these 
standards justify their decisions as best calculated based on the reasons they find the most 
important. In this sense, individuals empowered with discretion might also be made 
accountable by requiring their decisions to be accompanied by a justification. However, if the 
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justification is not automatically subjected to review by some other authority, the decision-
maker still possesses discretionary power.  
 
If there is a lack of accepted standards to justify the judgment, the decision-maker must 
provide a justification based on his or her personal normative principles or intuitions. The 
concept of personal autonomy allows for disagreement on such personal standards. 
Consequently, the receiver and the street-level bureaucrat might disagree about the rightness 
of a decision. This is something we have to live with in a democratic welfare state. What we 
cannot live with, however, are discretionary decisions that fail to be as best calculated to the 
decision-maker. Therefore, accountability at the street-level should be (as it often is) 
supported by institutionalised procedures for complaints so that decisions that are badly or 
arbitrary justified, can be reconsidered by some other authority empowered with discretion. 
Indirectly, this is a way to reduce an authority or individual’s arbitrary power to make badly 
justified decisions when distributing social goods on behalf of the people and it is a way to 
protect the vulnerable against this kind of maltreatment. Moreover, when this kind of indirect 
accountability to the clients and citizens is required, people are offered reasons to be 
confident that distribution is being appropriately carried out at street-level.  
 
Decisions about individual cases contain sensitive personal information. The first principle of 
a democratic welfare state discussed above, respecting individuals, cannot allow public access 
to sensitive information about their personal welfare. This would not be treating individuals as 
ends in themselves. Public access to personal information about someone’s welfare needs 
could be stigmatising, and it would also undermine their personal liberty to decide themselves 
about who knows their personal circumstances. One could wonder what is the point of 
providing justification for discretionary decisions if, normally, (when no one complains about 
the decision) there is nobody else to review the decisions concerning people’ privacy? At the 
end of any organised distribution chain, there are the receivers of the distributed good. 
Although they may have no right to overturn a decision, the receivers of distributed goods 
represent moral equals with claims to respectful treatment. They also represent the people by 
being a citizen. Individual, discretionary decisions at street level therefore require 
accountability, both morally and politically. Morally, those who are empowered with 
discretion in street-level distribution owe their clients justification for their decisions if the 
clients ask for it. Politically, they are also accountable for their decisions to the clients 
considered as citizens as they distribute a common good (Lauridsen, Norup et al. 2007).  
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We must note that the standards used to measure aggregated discretionary decisions within a 
distributive institution might help to maintain people’s confidence. But this kind of 
performance accountability in terms of measurable aims might clash with moral 
accountability needed to maintain the interpersonal trust between street-level bureaucrats and 
their clients (Smith 2001; Checkland, Marshall et al. 2004; Harrison and Smith 2004). For 
example, if the clinicians are focusing on fulfilling measurement aims it might affect their 
ability to hold on to what should be the focus, i.e. the patient best interest, and this might 
undermine the patient’s trust. 
 
Meta-regulation of discretionary judgments  
What more there is to say about Goodin’s point that those to whom discretion is delegated are 
supposed to arrive at conclusions they judge as ‘best calculated’. What could this actually 
mean in practice, given the need to maintain the public’s confidence in institutions and trust in 
individual street-level bureaucrats? If it is not left to individuals with discretionary power to 
assess this in a completely arbitrary manner, what more can be said about it? I will present 
below two different ways in which individual judgment might be regulated internally by those 
who themselves are making the judgments; 1) by recognising normative contexts in 
accordance with some overall aim of the discretionary work and 2) by recognising the 
different levels of justification.  
 
Normative frames for individual judgment 
Dworkin has pointed out that “Almost any situation in which a person acts…makes relevant 
certain standards of rationality, fairness, and effectiveness. We criticize each other’s acts in 
terms of these standards, and there is no reason not to do so when the acts are within the 
centre rather than beyond the perimeter of the doughnut of special authority.” (Dworkin 1978, 
p 33) Considered as standards, these particular standards must be of a kind other than those 
imposed by an external authority which originally defined the body of the doughnut.  
H. Grimen and A. Molander follow Dworkin in his assumptions that judgment is subject to 
formal normative regulations. Assuming that judgment works under the same conditions as 
practical reasoning in general, judgment is constrained by standards of rationality. In addition 
to the norms of rationality, they suggest there are ‘normative contexts of judgment’ that 
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impose yet other constraints on judgment. Judgment is exercised within the context of 
normative expectation derived from “the most general requirements imposed on the 
occupation or the system within which judgment is exercised” [author’s translation] (Grimen 
and Molander 2008, p 188). Such formal constraints on individual judgment could then also 
include what Dworkin refers to as ‘standards of fairness and effectiveness’. 
Grimen and Molander discuss three different kinds of idealised ‘normative contexts of 
discretion’ which can potentially frame discretionary judgments; the principle of equal 
treatment, the principle of reproducibility, and the principle of individualisation. Individual 
judgment is constrained by the principle of reproducibility when judgment is required to bring 
forward features of the context or a case which could be explained by some kind of 
knowledge that is accessible to others as well. Such knowledge could be specialised, 
professional knowledge and this would be a pre-condition for making a good judgment for 
instance in a health care situation, and it will be knowledge that others in a similar role would 
recognise as valid. The principle of equal treatment is at work where the resulting judgment is 
affected by and has implications for cases that are equal in relevant respect, i.e., how have 
other been treated before and how others will be treated in future. When discretion is 
exercised under this constraint, knowledge about how similar cases are treated is a pre-
condition for exercising good judgment, for instance, in law cases. These two principles are 
both categorised as principles that occur in contexts with a requirement of strong comparative 
consistency. The principle of individualisation calls for attention to the specific concerns of 
individuals. This principle is typically presented in contexts where the judgment is about how 
best to care for somebody. This principle does not presuppose comparison either to achieve 
consistency with other cases or to obtain consistency in how one person’s judgment of this 
case coincides with another person’s judgments of the case.  
 
All these principles might regulate judgment depending on the context. There might also be 
contexts where these regulating principles are brought into conflict with each other. Within 
the context of distributing a common welfare good, such as social services, scarcity of 
resources might bring judgment concerning what a client really needs in terms of economic 
support in order to manage may come into conflict with the requirement that everybody in a 
similar situation thereby has a claim on that kind of treatment. There will simply not be the 
means available for such a fair distribution. Moreover, in order to ensure strictly fair 
distribution across a population where everyone in a comparable situation with equal needs 
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gets the same, we would have to presume that every street-level bureaucrat was educated and 
trained to consider the same kinds of needs and would make identical judgments on particular 
needs. This suggests that the principle of reproducibility is called for under the demand for 
equality. Unfortunately, that discretionary judgments should work under the principle of 
reproducibility is an unobtainable ideal. Theoretically, there are good reasons why this must 
be expected. I will touch upon some of the reasons below, when I discuss the ‘burdens of 
judgment’ according to Rawls’ account. Here, however, we need to recognise that being 
empowered with the discretion to judge about particular claims on common goods might be 
subject to normative requirements that work against each other, and also to requirements that 
can come into conflict with what individual judgment can realistically be expected to provide 
(Grimen and Molander 2008).  
The normative constraints on individual judgments presented here are thought to be at work in 
various settings and constellations. How can the individuals making discretionary decisions 
know which formal principle or principles they should apply to the situation in hand? 
 
Normative contexts of judgment and the ideals of a democratic welfare 
state 
Those who are empowered with discretion within the distribution of common goods within a 
democratic welfare state will have to see their judgment restricted by the formal principles 
which follow from the ideal principles constituting this kind of state. I will now show how 
normative contexts of judgment might be derived from the three ideals (themselves derived 
from assumptions about autonomy) which I have set out to constitute a democratic welfare 
state above. 
The first principle (I) derived from the concept  of moral autonomy, tells us that all are 
considered moral equals with equal claims on the distribution of common goods and that 
those who are worst-off in relevant respects have an additional claim on resources to have 
their needs met.  
The requirement for equal treatment can be seen applied to the distribution of goods within a 
democratic welfare state in a three-stage model. Firstly, all individuals considered on an 
aggregate level with the characteristics shared by all citizens are ensured the same share of the 
goods by the rights attributed to all citizens. Secondly, everyone with common conditions that 
make them worse-off than others are treated equally by being attributed the same rights to 
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compensation. Thirdly, when the rights concerning redistribution are implemented, the 
individual discretionary judgment of street-level bureaucrats becomes central. Discretion is 
needed to identify who has a right to redistributed goods and to measure out the level of 
compensation whenever these factors are not explicitly written into the rights. Discretionary 
decisions about individual needs are also, at this level, subject to the requirement of equal 
treatment of what would, if individual cases were compared, be considered equal sets of 
relevant conditions that constitute the same need. According to the first principle of a 
democratic welfare state requiring that people are treated equally to maintain their moral 
standing as equals, it follows that discretionary judgments about individual needs will also be 
subjected to the principle of reproducibility. This means that in order to ensure equal 
treatment of equal cases, discretionary judgment should be used so that others would be 
expected to come to the same conclusion and equal cases across the population would be 
identified and treated equally by the judgment of different street-level bureaucrats. As I will 
discuss below, this requirement is unlikely to be met because of what Rawls has called the 
‘burdens of judgment’. Nevertheless, it remains a normative context of judgment within the 
structure of a democratic welfare state. So to summarise so far, the first principle of a 
democratic welfare state implies that discretionary judgment works within the normative 
contexts of judgment requiring equal treatment of similar cases and, implicitly, the 
reproducibility of individual judgments.  
Further, the second principle of a democratic welfare state (II) stresses the individuals’ right 
to set their own ends freely and endorse their own values. This must be compatible with an 
understanding of individual need. Individual needs will partly be created by the person 
acknowledging their situation as constituting a need. This depends on the ends they have set 
and the values they hold. It follows that those empowered with discretion to make decisions 
about people’s needs must also exercise their judgment under the constraining principle of 
individualisation. Individual conditions might occur in infinite combinations so that a 
condition which appear disadvantageous for one person might very well be unimportant to 
another person even when it is present in his or her situation. Needs (for compensation) 
cannot in general be adequately determined prior to assessment of the whole situation and 
predefining single conditions as disadvantageous might lead to mistakes. The principle of 
individualisation constrains the discretionary judgment of street-level bureaucrats in that they 
must identify the needs in accordance with the particular situation of their clients. 
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Finally, we must consider the third principle of a democratic welfare state (III) which tells us 
that individuals involved in developing political distributive institutions are subject to the 
requirements of fairness when they reflect over and endorse the ends or goals of their actions. 
Street-level bureaucrats who are supposed to realise the democratic principles for fair 
distribution will also be subject to this requirement when they exercise discretionary judgment 
in the absence of explicit authoritative rules. When someone is acting on behalf of the state’s 
authority, he or she is still responsible for maintaining fair distribution even where there are 
no principle-based rules to lean upon. For street-level bureaucrats working in a democratic 
welfare state, this means that they are already within a normative context of judgment that 
calls for fairness based on principles I-III. They are, by implication, also in the normative 
contexts of judgment derived from the principles, namely contexts that call for equal 
treatment, reproducibility and individualisation. Fair judgments, then, involve balancing the 
different requirements according to what the particular situations call for. 
 
The internal structure of fairness within a democratic welfare state 
As we saw above, Dworkin referred to a standard of fairness according to which it could be 
relevant to criticise people “when the acts are within the centre rather than beyond the 
perimeter of the doughnut of special authority” (Dworkin 1978, p 33). Now, we have 
established the connection between this standard of fairness and the normative contexts of 
judgment discussed by Grimen and Molander. This connection hinges on a trade-off between 
interpretations of how equal moral standing should affect general principles for distribution 
(welfare egalitarianism versus resource egalitarianism), resulting in particular principles for a 
democratic welfare state. My point here is that a substantive standard of fairness frames 
judgments at this superior level of a state regime, but as we will now see, a new substantive 
standard of fairness is also called for within the particular organisation of a democratic 
welfare state. The need to make new substantive trade-offs in the interpretation of equality 
reappears as a result of the tension between the normative context of judgment calling for 
equal treatment and the normative context of judgment calling for individualisation. This 
conflict occurs at the level of policy-making within a democratic welfare state, when it is 
decided whether distribution would be carried out most fairly by using strict rules or by 
delegating discretion. In the first case, equal treatment based on specified conditions will be 
ensured. In the other case, a better targeted individualisation of interpreted needs might be the 
result of discretionary considerations but at the expense of less equal treatment across the 
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population. This would be expected because of the burdens of judgment that undermine the 
reproducibility of discretionary judgments (I will soon elaborate more on this point). Deciding 
on policies to deal with this conflict, involves trade-offs corresponding to interpretations of 
which practical policy of redistribution (discretion or rules) is the most feasible way to ensure 
the standing of individuals as moral equals. The justification of this trade-off will be related to 
the particular good that is to be distributed as well as a clearly defined aim the distribution is 
intended to achieve. At this point, however, we should note that derived standards of fairness 
will be based on new trade-offs that must be made at the level of policy-making, where the 
aim is to realise the formal principles of fairness in a world where different kinds of need 
require compensation. 
 
Interpretations of ‘need’ 
The requirement of fairness in discretionary judgment has several implications. Practically, it 
means that those empowered with discretion must ideally understand the formal principles for 
distribution which constitute the basic institution of the state as well as the derived normative 
contexts of judgment which constrain the actual distribution. These form the background for 
making discretionary judgments about fair distribution. But the normative contexts of 
judgment constituting the idea of fairness would not be of much help without knowing the 
specific aim of the distribution of the good in question. Those who assess needs on behalf of 
the state must be able to answer: What is the objective of this distribution? This question 
implies i) an answer to why is this good a good for organised distribution. But it also involves 
ii) an interpretation of what actually constitutes a need for this particular good. The concept of 
‘need’ might be interpreted in different ways. For instance, if a good is very scarce, ‘needs’ 
might be considered comparatively so that those with the lowest level of welfare will be 
considered in greatest need. Alternatively, ‘needs’ might be considered in relation to who has 
the greatest potential to benefit or the greatest increment in welfare (Elster 1992). Resources 
might be distributed quite differently depending on how ‘need’ is interpreted.  
If a distribution of a given good is supposed to be fair, the aims of the distribution, as it relates 
to a given interpretation of ‘need’, should be clarified on a political level so that 
interpretations of need for that good can be based on equal treatment of citizens. However, 
predefined needs cannot always handle cases of inequalities that call for interpretation under 
the requirement of individualisation, as would often be the case in health care. We will 
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continue to consider the internal structure of fairness all the way throughout the organised 
state. Briefly, we will now prepare for considerations about fairness in relation to the 
judgment of street-level bureaucrats by looking into a model of the conditions that trigger 
individual judgment. 
 
A general model of judgment 
Grimen and Molander make use of Toulmin’s model of general argumentation to get a grip on 
the general contexts that trigger judgment (Toulmin 2003). Their assumption is that exercising 
judgment should be understood in accordance with how practical reasoning is carried out in 
general. Practical reasoning is reasoning about how one should act in a given situation. To put 
it briefly, practical reasoning involves data about the concrete context one is about to act 
upon, and ‘warrants’ or norms that justify the conclusions reached about what to do. The 
‘warrants’ might be of different kinds. They might be norms of duty pointing out what one has 
to do in certain circumstances. They might be instrumental norms telling us what to do if we 
want to achieve a certain goal, and they might be teleological norms that require us to strive 
for a certain goal by finding the appropriate means. Taken together, the descriptions (data) of 
the situation and the norm are our reasons for acting. These reasons might themselves need to 
be subject to justification that calls for new warrants. The warrants used to justify a 
description of a context (so that the decision about what to do can be related to that context), 
are called rules of identification. The norm that justifies an action might also be justified. This 
happens by arguing that the norm is valid, that is, by arguing that it ought to be applied, or by 
arguing for its compliance with the situation in question. Against this background, Grimen 
and Molander conclude that on the presumption that warrants present themselves with various 
degree of strength that can be arranged on a continuum, judgment is most at play in those 
situations where the warrants are the weakest. Weak warrants are the causes of uncertainty 
about the actions different situations call for. Judgment is required to bring the situation to a 
practical conclusion (that is action, on the assumption there exists no weakness of the will) by 
bringing this indeterminacy to an end.  
 
Discretionary judgment and individual needs for compensation 
When it is considered fair on an institutional level to allow distribution by using the discretion 
of street level bureaucrats (thereby avoiding pre-defined needs handled by applying specific 
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rules) the political aim of the distribution is formulated vaguely precisely so that individual 
adjustments can be made. As we saw above, judgment is typically called for in order to fill 
out indeterminacy in teleological reasoning (Grimen and Molander 2008). Those empowered 
with discretion to make individually adjusted redistributions within a democratic welfare 
state, are required to exercise judgment to bring to an end the indeterminacy of both the aim 
and the appropriate means when they are considering the conditions of particular cases. This 
illuminates the core structure of interpreting needs. Interpreting needs presupposes an 
understanding of: the aim of the good in question, specific occupational knowledge about 
means that accord with the good, and information about specific cases under consideration. 
The aim of the good forms the basis for the relevancy of the case and the means or action 
required. 
The ambiguity of a formal interpretation of ‘need’ might cause different interpretations of 
what there actually is a need for in a particular case. If it were possible to decide at an 
institutional level which formal interpretation of need street-level bureaucrats are supposed to 
comply with, would equal treatment across the population then be expected? Because of the 
requirement of individualisation, judgment is needed to decide about what is an acceptable 
level of welfare and what increment of improvement should be reached for particular clients. 
This kind of assessment might be given some objectivity or inter-subjectivity if they are based 
on practice developed by tradition or consensus among the members of an occupational 
collective. Nevertheless, the aspect of fairness with regard to the requirement of 
reproducibility will only reach as wide as the community of shared practice. Thereby, the 
requirement of equal treatment is only partly ensured in the whole population. Let us now 
consider how street-level bureaucrat’s judgments about acceptable levels of welfare and 
increment of improvement needed might come about. 
 
Conditions for interpreting individual needs 
When fair distribution is carried out, it is left to those empowered with discretion to reflect 
over the aim of the distribution when they are facing individual cases. A need for a distributed 
good can be defined as a condition-treatment pairing (Hasman, Hope et al. 2006). The 
interpretation of the aim of distribution must be fair in the sense that what is seen as 
‘appropriate means’, i.e., what is needed, is subjected to the formal political conception of 
fairness allowing for equal treatment, reproducibility and individualisation. This indicates that 
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the aim of the distribution and the potential, available means in a given situation might affect 
each other reciprocally which again affects what comes out as a considered need in a 
particular context. The fact that the aim of distribution has been vaguely formulated higher in 
the process and that potential means are already known as occupational knowledge, allows for 
balancing a condition-treatment pairing which constitutes a need for a certain good under the 
requirement of fairness. How can “balancing a condition-treatment pairing which constitutes a 
need under the requirement of fairness” be brought about? To clarify this, we will consider 
the method of reflective equilibrium and the idea of the reasonable versus the rational. 
 
Reflective equilibrium 
The method of reflective equilibrium has been considered both as a philosophical and as a 
more general method of epistemology (Daniels 1996; Daniels 2003). Rawls made use of the 
method in a philosophical sense when he discussed how people could be expected to agree on 
a set of principles of justice (Rawls 1971; Rawls 1993). The same methodological principles 
are well suited to describe how we justify and establish our beliefs as individuals in general. 
N. Daniels states that searching for a reflective equilibrium is an everyday practice we all 
engage in when we reflect over and revise our beliefs (Daniels 2003). The search for a 
reflective equilibrium is more precisely described as a search for coherence between 
considered judgments about particular situations (i.e. our ‘intuitions’), beliefs about the 
principles we use to govern our judgments and the theories we assume make these principles 
acceptable. Because of the influence of Rawls’ theory about justice, the method has been 
attributed particularly to works in ethics and political theory although, in initial works, it was 
considered appropriate for justifying logical principles (Daniels 2003).  
 
A crucial feature of the method is that reflective equilibrium “...includes our considered 
convictions at all levels of generality; no one level, say that of abstract principle or that of 
particular judgments in particular cases, is viewed as foundational. They all may have an 
initial credibility” (Rawls 1993, footnote 8, p 8). In this way the method distinguishes itself 
from theories which presume that the direction of justification moves downwards with 
“ready-made” principles being applied to particular situations. It is also different from views 
which assume that the direction of justification is upwards, from particular situations into 
principles, represented by theories such as particularism and casuistry (Toulmin 1981; Jonsen 
 39 
1991; Callahan 2000). However, this does not mean that reflective equilibrium rejects these 
two distinct structures of justification; rather that it encompasses them both. The method of 
reflective equilibrium allows justification to run along and across different levels of justifying 
generality represented by judgment, principles and theories, with the aim of achieving 
coherence in all (relevant) beliefs. By ending up with a coherent system, we will not only 
have achieved consistency between our beliefs, but they will mutually support and explain 
each other. 
 
There is an important distinction between narrow and wide reflective equilibrium (Daniels 
1996). Narrow equilibrium describes the process when particular moral judgments about a 
particular situation are justified according to moral standards and vice versa. Moral judgment 
about particular situations might challenge a moral standard which has been applied quite 
adequately in other similar situations, thereby leading to revision of the standard. Likewise, 
consultation of moral standards might affect moral judgments which initially seemed 
intuitive. Starting out with a considered judgment, which is a judgment we initially feel 
intuitively convinced by, we seek confirmation in the principles or rules we believe support 
the judgment. Working back and forth between judgments and principles, we search for 
coherence between our particular and our more general beliefs, yet we might ask: Why should 
we accept the exact pairing of reciprocally affirming judgment and principle we end up with? 
We need further support for our beliefs and this can be found in various theories, moral as 
well as non-moral, which bring a higher level of generality into our justifying process. When 
we obtain coherence between all the judgments, principles and theories we have considered, 
we have brought our reflection into a wide reflective equilibrium.  
 
This method goes for anyone trying to ensure solid ground for his or her normative beliefs 
and this, of course, includes street-level bureaucrats. The bureaucrat, however, are also 
subject to the requirement of maintaining the assumed fair principles of a democratic welfare 
state in the way they consider and meet inequalities while distributing a common good. Is 
there anything more that can be said about how best calculated judgment of those empowered 
with discretion should be constrained in this regard? 
 
To explore this issue further, I will present Rawls’ distinction between a rational and a 
reasonable person and his concept of ‘the burden of judgment’. I also introduce Scanlon’s 
idea of a reasonable person in order to map more adequately the normative constraints on 
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individual discretionary judgment. Against this background, I sum up the hierarchy of levels 
of justification which might explain individual judgments as best calculated. 
 
Rawls on the rational and the first basic aspect of the reasonable  
Rawls bases his distinction between the rational and the reasonable on W.M. Sibley’s work 
about these concepts. (Sibley 1953) A rational person deliberates over his or hers own ends, 
interests and life-plans, their priority and how to achieve them. The ends might be selected 
and ordered in many different ways and are not necessarily only of benefit to the self. They 
might well also concern the well-being of others. Even so, the solely rational person is 
distinguished from a reasonable one, by the lack of “the particular form of moral sensibility 
that underlies the desire to engage in fair cooperation as such and to do so on terms that 
others as equals might reasonably be expected to endorse” (Rawls 1993, p 51). The 
reasonable person will be a rational person, but is also characteristically moved to “…desire 
for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on 
terms all can accept” (Rawls 1993, p 50). Rawls does not take this particular willingness of 
the reasonable person to be all that there is to moral sensibility. However, he takes moral 
sensibility to include the part about fair social cooperation (Rawls 1993). Moved by this 
particular sense of justice, reasonable people, among equals, “… are ready to propose 
principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given 
the assurance that others will likewise do so. The norms they view as reasonable for everyone 
to accept and therefore as justifiable to them: and they are ready to discuss the fair terms that 
others propose.” (Rawls 1993, p 49). In more concrete terms, reasonable people take into 
account the effects of their actions on other people’s well-being. It also follows that we enter 
the public world and engage in social relations as ‘reasonable people’ by proposing or 
accepting fair terms of cooperation with others. 
 
So far we have considered one basic aspect of the reasonable, but Rawls emphasises that 
reasonable must also be understood in another way. This is related to Rawls’s specific aim of 
discussing the conditions necessary for deliberating legitimate institutions based on the idea 
of justice understood as fairness. Briefly, justice with regard to the construction of basic 
institutions is not arrived at simply by applying what might appear (for someone) to be an 
appropriate principle. Just institutions are based on principles arrived at by processes of 
collective deliberation by reasonable people.  
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The burdens of judgment 
We have considered the particular motivation to engage in fair cooperation, but why should 
we believe this willingness would be all we need for reasonable persons to agree on matters of 
the state’s constitution? Empirically, we find no evidence to justify such an expectation, rather 
the contrary. Disagreement about the deepest held values of reasonable people appears 
inevitable. The second aspect of the reasonable links to the recognition of this fact which is 
due to what Rawls calls the burdens of judgment. Let us briefly look into his account of these 
burdens as well as his account of reasonable comprehensive doctrines before presenting this 
second aspect. 
 
The ‘burdens of judgment’ refers to the sources that may cause disagreement between 
reasonable persons. Reasonable persons are assumed to share a common human reason that 
enables them to “draw inferences, weigh evidence, and balance competing considerations”, 
but the many hazards involved in the exercise of reason and judgment lead individuals to 
arrive at different reasonable conclusions (Rawls 1993, p 55). Rawls points out the six most 
obvious sources that might cause disagreement. These are; the difficulty of assessing complex 
empirical and scientific cases, the weighting of relevant considerations, the vagueness of 
concepts that imply exercise of judgment and interpretation might differ between reasonable 
people, the way assessment of evidence and weighting of values are, to some extent, shaped 
by individual experience, the difficulty in making an overall assessment when there are 
normative considerations of different force on both sides of an issue, and finally, the difficulty 
of setting priorities and making adjustments when one has to select between different values 
within systems of social institutions that cannot realise every cherished value (Rawls 1993, pp 
56-7). Because of the burdens of judgment, pluralism of philosophical, moral and religious 
views cannot be avoided and deep substantive disagreements concerning these kinds of issues 
are to be expected. 
 
Reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
Rawls uses the term reasonable comprehensive doctrines to describe the views held by 
reasonable people (Rawls 1993, p 59). Reasonable comprehensive doctrines are characterised 
by three main features: 1) They can be considered an exercise of theoretical reason in that 
they organise and characterise “…recognized values so that they are compatible with one 
another and express an intelligible view of the world” covering the religious, philosophical 
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and moral aspects of human life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner. 2) They are 
considered an exercise of practical reason in that they enable the reasonable person to 
distinguish between salient and less important values as well as balancing values when these 
are brought into conflict. 3) Reasonable comprehensive doctrines draw upon traditions and 
therefore possess some stability over time. They are not fixed doctrines, but there must be 
good reasons for the doctrines to change.  
 
Second aspect of the reasonable 
Against this background of burdens of judgment and reasonable comprehensive doctrines, 
Rawls identifies the second basic aspect of the reasonable as “…the willingness to recognise 
the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in 
directing the legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime.” (Rawls 1993, p 
54). So a reasonable person is not only driven by a moral sense of justice to propose fair 
principles on the assumption that they are principles that anyone could endorse. A reasonable 
person is also willing to subject himself to the political principles arrived at by collective 
deliberation on the recognition that other people might hold different, but equally reasonable 
views. However, such a unifying political basis for a state does not require agreement on a 
comprehensive doctrine. That would be unreasonable in the light of the burdens of judgment 
(Rawls 1993). According to Rawls, there will be particular political principles concerning the 
basic institutions of a society, which might be agreed upon and justified according to 
different, incompatible comprehensive views. He sees the area of potential agreement 
between different comprehensive doctrines as the field where various comprehensive 
doctrines overlap each other. This overlapping consensus represents the goal for reasonable 
agreement about political principles. The reasonable political principles shared by people who 
have different moral and religious views are justified in accordance with divergent rationales 
constituted by opposing comprehensive views. Rawls considers overlapping consensus to be a 
precondition for stability. Stability of a democratic welfare state, for instance, requires that its 
political constitution can be the focus of an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines 
supporting the constitutional regime. 
 
Leaving aside for a moment the epistemological consequences of being a reasonable person, I 
now consider the particular motivation this characteristic implies for a street-level bureaucrat. 
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Reasonable street-level bureaucrat: Motivational aspects 
First, we must recognise that whether street-level bureaucrats act as reasonable people is an 
issue that we can only try to affirm or deny empirically. Here, my concern is ideal theory and 
I will first question whether street-level bureaucrats ideally should be expected to be 
reasonable in one, both or none of the aspects outlined above. Here we must remember that 
discretion in this setting is delegated authority to determine individual needs for economic or 
social compensation (including health care) in order to maintain the idea of people as moral 
equals within a structured organisation of basic institutions, which are assumed to be fair. As I 
have tried to show, their discretionary judgment is situated in the normative contexts derived 
from the (assumed) fair principles which constitute a democratic welfare state. This, of 
course, does not guarantee that the street-level bureaucrats’ are aware of these constraints. 
However, street-level bureaucrats educated to deal with specific distributional tasks would be 
expected to act under these requirements in some form as the result of a socialisation process 
running through their education and working experience. But again, ideally, how should we 
expect those empowered with discretion to be motivated to act in a way that maintains fair 
distribution?   
 
In my approach here, I have considered discretionary judgment within a state based on fair 
principles concerning rights and liberties and I have then considered the general normative 
contexts of judgment these principles imply. With regard to the assessment of needs by street-
level bureaucrats, I have not discussed the issues of substantive interpretations of which 
inequalities ought to be to be compensated for or how compensation should be carried out in 
order to be fair. These issues concern distributive justice, and in accordance with my 
exposition so far, I take the derived general normative contexts of judgment to frame the 
fairness of these distributive principles within a democratic welfare state. Considered in this 
way, if street-level bureaucrats enjoy vast discretionary freedom in determining needs for 
compensation, their decisions should hinge upon some substantive principles of distributive 
justice. These principles thereby play a crucial role in how the distribution is actually carried 
out and they cannot be considered a matter for street-level bureaucrats’ private opinions. They 
must be of the kind that any reasonable person would be willing to propose on the basis that 
all other reasonable people would accept it. This is how principles become fair. Interestingly, 
Rawls comments that it is possible to hold reasonable views without being reasonable oneself. 
In other words, a street-level bureaucrat might act on fair principles without being concerned 
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about the social implications of so acting. However, I will claim that in order to become a 
competent street-level bureaucrat who lives up to the delegated responsibility of discretion, 
one must be expected to distribute fairly because one desires to do so, from case to case, not 
because one, by coincidence, happens to do so. So the first aspect of the reasonable, that is the 
distinct moral sense of justice, seems to characterise our ideal street-level bureaucrat.  
 
Moreover, the second aspect seems to be required as well. In order to distribute fairly, the 
street-level bureaucrat must be willing to recognise that others might hold equally well 
justified comprehensive views, and public reason is called for to settled the basic principles by 
over-lapping consensus. Street-level bureaucrats are supposed to subject their action to this 
legitimate political power. This must involve forming their concepts of distributive justice 
when exercising discretionary judgment in accordance with the normative contexts of 
judgment derived from the legitimate basic principles. In order to try to map the terrain of 
motivation more adequately, let us briefly look into the idea of reasonableness as regarded by 
T. M. Scanlon. 
 
Scanlon about reasonable  
Scanlon shares Rawls’ idea about identifying the core structure of reasonable judgment in the 
willingness of the deliberator to provide justification that is acceptable to others who share the 
same aim of justification. Scanlon, however, has a different agenda. He applies 
‘reasonableness’ in order to clarify the normative and motivational force of judgments about 
right and wrong. He holds the view that:”...thinking about right and wrong is, at the most 
basic level, thinking about what could be justified to others on grounds that they, if 
appropriately motivated, could not reasonably reject.”  (Scanlon 1998, p 5). His theory 
concerns the part of morality “…having to do with our duties to other people, including such 
things as requirements to aid them, and prohibitions against harming, killing, coercion, and 
deception”. (Scanlon 1998, p 6).  Reasonable judgments are judgments “about the suitability 
of certain principles to serve as the basis of mutual recognition and accommodation” which 
expose the moral content of these judgment (Scanlon 1998, p 194). Scanlon has adopted the 
phrase “what we owe to each other” to label the part of morality he has in mind. He explains 
the special authority of requirements of justifiability to others by showing that this idea is 
involved in our relations with each other in aspects of life that matter to us. In this way, 
‘reasonableness’ on Scanlon’s account relates both to an appropriate way of justifying a 
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course of action and to the accompanying motivating reasons that emerge out of ‘what we 
owe to each other’. He does not only provide us with a psychological principle of motivation, 
but he also offers an answer to the fundamental question why anyone should care about 
morality at all. According to Rawls, his own two aspects of the reasonable can be seen as 
closely connected with Scanlon’s principle of moral motivation although he does not 
elaborate on this connection (Rawls 1993 footnote 2, p 49). 
 
In between Rawls’ and Scanlon’s differently motivated calls for 
reasonableness  
The focus of Rawls’s account is how to reach fair decisions about basic political institutions 
of an organised state. He seems to take the motivation of reasonable persons to care about fair 
cooperation as a given, uncontested pre-condition. Scanlon’s project covers a wide field of 
morality constituted by judgments about right and wrong when he provides an account that 
connects the proper justification for moral distinctions between right and wrong with the 
required motivation of people who try to act morally successfully. People empowered with 
the discretion to decide on claims from other individuals within an organised democratic 
welfare state, will have to respond to the call for reasonableness as found in both Rawls’ and 
Scanlon’s theories. As agents who contribute to maintaining the political institutions of fair 
distribution, they must respond to the requirements of reasonableness in terms of reflecting on 
aggregated concerns appropriate to institutional models. This way of thinking corresponds to 
the way reasonableness was laid out by Rawls. Their moral equal standing with specific 
others whose needs they have to consider and whose share of the distribution they must claim, 
calls for reasonableness corresponding to the moral motivation Scanlon defends; 
reasonableness emerges from relations humans are involved in. Caught in between these 
slightly different demands for reasonable decision-making, those empowered with discretion 
will have to make their judgments according to constraints of reasonableness that potentially 
do not to coincide. This point about the different structural directions of justification can be 
yet another way to explain the conflicting demands street-level bureaucrats are working 
under. 
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Reasonable street-level bureaucrat: Epistemological implications 
What are the epistemological implications that can be drawn from both Rawls’ and Scanlon’s 
accounts for reasonable persons? On the assumption that street-level bureaucrats are 
reasonable people both in the moral and the political sense, we can now consider how we 
should expect them to justify others individual needs according to the idea of reflective 
equilibrium. We may do so by looking into what appears as a hierarchy of justification. 
 
First, we must recognise the theoretical possibility that discretionary judgments might be 
completely arbitrary in the sense of being disconnected from any reflection of normative 
requirements at all. In that case, the judgment might represent what someone ‘felt to be right’, 
or ‘the way one is used to consider such cases’. This sense of arbitrariness can be 
distinguished from the sense in which judgments will be inherently arbitrary. Because of the 
burdens of judgment, different reasonable individuals may hold different reasonable views. 
Holding completely arbitrary judgments indicates that the person in question has not reflected 
over their reasons for acting in certain ways. Contrarily, if someone holds inherently arbitrary 
judgments reflection would have taken place. Inherently arbitrary judgments can be presented 
in two categories. In the first version, the person who is about to make a decision is rational 
in that he or she just sets an end for what he or she wants to obtain by performing the 
distribution and chooses means accordingly when considering particular cases. Another 
alternative is that he or she is reasonable (which does not prevent him or her from acting 
rationally) by striving to fulfil the goal of distribution in a way that other reasonable people, 
people who share the same aim for justification of their views, find acceptable. While a 
rational person will only justify their decisions according to a goal they set for themselves, 
reasonable people will have to understand this goal for the decision-making in terms they 
would expect other reasonable people to agree on. The outcome of different rational people’s 
judgments about who should get which goods must be expected to vary if they all were to 
judge the same case. This would not come as any surprise. But the same will also be true of 
reasonable people’s judgments about a particular case because of what Rawls referred to as 
‘the burdens of judgment’. So although the considerations lead to what the decision-maker 
considers to be a reasonable view, it is still arbitrary but in an inherent sense. It is arbitrary in 
a way that cannot be avoided despite the means as well as the aim being well justified. 
 
 47 
Considered hierarchically, we can distinguish from the bottom up between discretionary 
judgments that are completely arbitrary, those which are simply rational and those which are 
reasonable. However, this last category of reasonable judgments can be divided into two sub-
groups as they might be reasonable in a theoretical sense or in an empirical sense. A street-
level bureaucrat might believe he or she holds a reasonable view on what to distribute. But 
whether other reasonable people would actually consider the reasons provided for the 
concrete distribution as fair, might be questioned. This is not only because burdens of 
judgment might entail reasonable disagreement. It might also be that the street-level 
bureaucrat while believing him or herself to be reasonable, has stopped the process of 
reflection too soon. The street-level bureaucrat may mistakenly believe that when there is 
established coherence between the moral judgment about what to do in the concrete case and 
a principle (narrow reflective equilibrium) even also background theory (wide reflective 
equilibrium), the grounds for the proposed action are reasonable. The problem is that it would 
take a certain capacity to ‘draw oneself up by the hair’ to get an overall view of all the 
competing principles and theories that could potentially have initiated revision of the 
judgment by the street-level bureaucrat. Considered in this way, an assumption about the 
reasonableness of one’s own judgment when deliberating alone would either mean 1) one has 
an unjustified belief that others as a matter of fact will accept the reasons grounding the 
proposed action, or simply 2) one believes one has well justified reasons for the proposal. 
Notice that both 1) and 2) are compatible with the moral sense of justice characterising the 
reasonable. 
 
So in order to test the reasonableness of one’s judgment, that is to find out whether the terms 
one believes to be fair actually appear so in others’ views as well, the justification process 
should move towards a wide collective reflective equilibrium, involving the points of view of 
all concerned by the distribution: that is ultimately the whole society. Thus the reasonable 
might provide judgments that are reasonable in the sense of appearing fair within a narrow or 
wide individual deliberation or a wide collective deliberation towards reflective equilibrium. 
We can now divide the potential justification of street-level bureaucrats’ reasonable 
judgments into three sub-categories of how well the judgment about the particular need is 
justified. 
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Levels of justification 
Below I present the hierarchy of justified judgments with regard to their level of justification. 
Note that what actually can be demonstrated as fair judgment in the sense of being accepted 
by all reasonable persons might appear at every level in inverse proportion to being a pure 
coincidence. 
 
Collective, wide reflective equilibrium 
Individual, wide reflective equilibrium 
 
Reasonable 
Judgments Individual, narrow reflective equilibrium 
                       Rational Judgments 
Inherently 
arbitrary 
                       Completely arbitrary 
 
By the hierarchy of levels of justification for fair reasons presented here we are left with yet 
another way to consider the normative meta-regulation of discretionary judgments. In addition 
to the normative context of judgment this adds new criteria to which discretionary judgment 
can be evaluated as best calculated. 
 
From formal considerations to substantive compliance 
We can now return to the question above: How can we “balance a condition-treatment pairing 
which constitutes a need under the requirement of fairness”? When discretionary judgment is 
called for to determine a need for a certain good, and the goal of the distribution is vaguely 
articulated, the street-level bureaucrat is left with his or her specific occupational knowledge, 
experience and habits to decide what it will be fair to offer. Ideally then, we can imagine a 
process of balancing a condition-treatment pairing that takes place against the background of 
an individual deliberation towards reflective equilibrium. In this deliberation, beliefs about the 
need for a certain good (represented as the means to realise the goal) and the goal it self are 
tested and eventually revised against each other. But the need must also be tested against the 
general principles of equal treatment, reproducibility and individualisation in order to be 
justified as fair. Could this treatment be provided to everyone in the same situation? Would 
the reasons I identify also be reasons my colleagues (with the same education) would stress as 
the essential reasons? Is this really what this particular person should have? Revising a need 
might then again result in revision of the presumed goal of distribution. Then, the street-level 
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bureaucrat should be aware of the various efforts one can make in order to end up with the 
best justification. Ideally, when deliberating alone one could try to challenge one’s own view 
by testing it against other surrounding judgments, principles and theories. Moreover, if 
possible, consideration about what would be fair to provide is more likely to come out as 
reasonable if it is tested against other people’s different points of view. So ideally, 
considerations about fair particular needs should be carried out collectively. 
 
Ideally, this is what “balancing a condition-treatment pairing which constitutes a need under 
the requirement of fairness” adds up to. This is how fair distribution might be carried out by 
street-level bureaucrats who imposed acknowledged normative constraints on their own 
reflection while also being willing to act on their conclusions. This indicates the general 
structure of a framework for evaluating discretionary judgment. 
 
Summary of the general framework  
So far I have presented a general framework for individual, discretionary judgment, delegated 
and exercised within a democratic welfare state. I have presumed three general principles 
derived from the idea of moral, personal and political autonomy. I have deliberatively 
presented these principles broadly enough to cover various theoretical and actual versions of 
states based on welfare and democracy. Against this background, I posed the question of how 
calls for individual judgment within the institutionalised structure of a democratic welfare 
state would be constrained. Considering the distinction between discretion and judgment, I 
have described how confidence in institutions and trust in individuals enables democracy and 
targeted welfare distribution and I have considered how accountability is required to maintain 
these attitudes. Further, I have considered two different approaches to normative meta-
regulation of individual discretionary judgments; normative contexts of judgment and levels 
of justification. These approaches add up to a general framework for evaluating discretionary 
judgments in terms of fairness.  
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DISTINCT TOPICS AND SPECIFIED FRAMEWORKS 
The specific topics for this study are surrogate decision-making on behalf of patients who 
have been assessed as not competent to make their own decisions, and just claims on health 
care put forward by physicians. Against the general account for discretionary judgments, I 
will now specify these topics separately. First, I account for how a well established practice of 
surrogate-decision-making based on individual judgment institutionalised in a democratic 
welfare state raises the question of trustworthy treatment of individuals deprived their moral 
and political right to make autonomous choices. Secondly, I look closer into the complexity of 
conditions involved in making just health care claims within a democratic welfare state by 
discussing the structural frames for trustworthy equitable clinical judgments. This section of 
particular frameworks leads towards specification of the aims of the articles. 
 
Competence assessment, surrogate decision-making and 
discretionary judgment  
For decades now, the autonomy of patients has been considered a crucial value to be 
promoted in health care contexts. The idea of patients’ self-governance has been explored and 
discussed from a varieties of angles; what does the idea involve (Faden and Beauchamp 1986; 
Beauchamp and Childress 2001), when did respect for patients coincide with respect for 
autonomy (Lysaught 2004), autonomy and enrolment in research (National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979; Emanuel, 
Wendler et al. 2000; Helsinki-deklarasjonen 2000), the consequences of patient autonomy in 
physician-patient relationship (Quill and Brody 1996), consequences of patient autonomy on 
implicit health care rationing (Lauridsen, Norup et al. 2007), how autonomy relates to 
competence for decision-making (Beauchamp and Childress 2001), and how patient 
autonomy affects physicians’ priority settings (Carlsen and Norheim, 2005). 
 
Patients’ autonomy can be described and discussed in quite different ways. It might be 
considered, in terms as moral autonomy, as personal autonomy and as political autonomy. 
There is a general moral duty to take care of vulnerable patients in order to treat them as ends 
in themselves (moral autonomy). This duty also involves respecting their capacity to set ends 
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for themselves and derive opinions about their own best interest (moral and personal 
autonomy). And finally, patients are also citizens with political rights and obligations 
(political autonomy).   
 
The most debated issue concerning patient autonomy is probably informed consent. 
Interestingly, the practice of requiring consent from a patient might be justified by both moral 
and personal versions of autonomy and this can perhaps explain the indubitable attractiveness 
of this practice. The practice sustains moral autonomy in that people are respected by being 
treated as ends in themselves and not subjected to the physicians’ concepts of the patients’ 
best interest. Furthermore, requiring consent is a way to respect personal autonomy by leaving 
the health care decision to rest on individuals’ concepts of their own best interest. And finally, 
the requirement of patient consent is, when institutionalised, a way to demonstrate patients’ 
political group power versus the political group power of health care workers as it sets 
boundaries to potential coercion in terms of patient rights.  
 
Considered as ideal theory, it is hard to find arguments against requiring patient’s consent for 
health care treatment. However, challenges arise as soon as ideal theory is to be put into 
practice in specific settings of individual health care distribution. We can question whether 
patients who sign a consent formula or affirm by a nod, really are individuals freely 
considering their own best. Is it even obvious what they are actually consenting to? Do they 
consent to the unpredictable consequences of the health care interventions such as irritating or 
even dangerous side effects? What does informed consent actually amount to (O'Neill 2002; 
O'Neill 2003)?  
 
Despite the conspicuous attention paid to ensuring patients’ consent to health care treatment, 
the many obscurities attached to the practice have led to doubts about the true value of 
consent as it is currently practised (Schneider 1998; O'Neill 2002). O’Neill seems to conclude 
that the only effect of the consent procedure (although this in itself is an important aspect) is 
to provide some protection against misuse and exploitation since the procedure allows the 
patient to refuse suggested treatment (O'Neill 2002). Furthermore, the practice can be seen as 
in conflict with at least the concept of moral autonomy. Someone might use their right to deny 
health care and this is a decision to be respected no matter what the resulting condition for the 
patient. For others, witnessing the patient’s preventable suffering, the ideal of promoting 
personal autonomy by denying treatment could be seen to be at odds with the ideal of moral 
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autonomy requiring of us to help others by treating them as ends in themselves. This would 
not be seen as a real conflict if the denial was an expression of the patient’s genuine personal 
autonomy. But given all the obscurity involved in the consent process, there are times when 
there could rightfully be reason to doubt whether the person in question is actually realising 
his or her personal autonomy by refusing treatment. In such cases, the two concepts of 
autonomy are brought into conflict by a practice mainly designed to maintain personal 
autonomy. 
 
We can see that personal autonomy seems to have the strongest standing of the autonomy 
concepts potentially involved in patient autonomy, by the way the requirement for consent 
structures the way all patients are treated. All adult patients are treated as if they possess the 
necessary personal autonomy to make their own qualified decisions about their own health 
care, until there are reasons to doubt their capacity for doing so (Buchanan and Brock 1990). 
Logically, it then follows that they need to have their capacity assessed before actions are 
taken on the basis of their expressed preferences. If they are assessed not competent to make 
autonomous decisions, whether they consent or not to an intervention no longer matters. At 
this point, the concept of moral autonomy supports institutionalised practice in the 
appointment of surrogate decision-makers. Surrogate decision-makers are supposed to ensure 
that the patient’s best interests are maintained. In one view, this represents a way to place the 
moral responsibility for the incompetent’s well-being with someone, thus, protecting the 
patient’s right to be treated as an end in themselves when at their most vulnerable. In another 
view, by appointing a surrogate decision-maker who knew the patient when they were 
competent, one might argue that the personal autonomy of the patient is extended. The 
patients- self-determination can be seen as extended by decisions which rest on assumptions 
about what the patient would have valued if still competent. This type of substitute judgment 
has been heavily criticised for being speculative and based purely on hypothetical thinking 
(Buchanan and Brock 1990). Nevertheless, there is little debate that any standard of best 
interest should involve considerations about what the formerly competent patient used to 
value (Brock 1996). In this way, the ideal of personal autonomy is carried on into the care of 
those assessed to be incompetent. 
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O’Neill about the triumph of personal autonomy in health care 
O’Neill criticises the triumph of what she calls the Principle of Individual Autonomy (what I 
call ‘personal autonomy’) in contemporary bioethics for undermining rather than fostering 
trustworthy professional performance (O'Neill 2002). O’Neill argues that in practice the 
Principle of Individual Autonomy amounts to no more than a requirement for informed 
consent. By requiring the patient’s consent to medical interventions, the idea of patients 
making autonomous choices is considered to be ‘attended to’ no matter what the Principle of 
Individual Autonomy actually involves. Hence, in its most modest form, the Principle of 
Individual Autonomy is equivalent to giving informed consent. O’Neill considers this 
principle unable to bear the ethics of biomedicine. Instead she introduces Principled 
Autonomy (moral autonomy), a principle based on a Kantian concept of autonomy. In short, 
Principled Autonomy is considered to be “a non-derivative, fundamental requirement on 
thought and action” (O'Neill 2002, p 94), which implies that ”we act only on principles that 
can be principles for all; it provides a basis for an account of the underlying principles for 
universal obligations and rights that can structure relationships between agents” (O'Neill 
2002, p 96). “Autonomy in action is no more - but also no less - that the attempt to act on 
principles on which all others could act” (O'Neill 2002, p 94). Principles that are of major 
importance in bioethics such as rejecting and avoiding coercion and deception, exemplify 
such basic principles of morality. In bioethics, as in everyday life, O’Neill stresses the task of 
“identifying ways to live up to these principles in actual circumstances” but doubts that any 
timeless account can be provided of “the more narrowly specified human rights and human 
obligations that would express and implement these principles, or of specific institutional 
structures needed to realise these rights and obligations at all times and all places” (O'Neill 
2002, p 95). By re-thinking autonomy as Principled Autonomy, she points out how the 
practice of informed consent must be bolstered by the health care workers acting trustworthily 
in health care contexts according to the demands of the basic moral principles.  
 
Those who have commented on O’Neill’s writings about the need for re-establishing trust 
(she seems to use ‘trust’ primarily in the sense of ‘confidence’) in bioethics, seem to be 
occupied with details in her interpretation of the Kantian argument for Principled autonomy 
(Wilson 2007), the practical implications of this way of rethinking autonomy in clinical 
practice (Stirrat and Gill 2005) and the role of trust in health care (Hall 2005). In my reading, 
O’Neill has made an important theoretical move back to the institutional level where the ideal 
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requirement for consent has been transformed into the policy of requiring informed consent. 
By picking up the Kantian version of moral autonomy, she tries to re-establish one of the ideal 
principles which underlie the initial requirement for institutionalising consent. This principle 
was lost in the translation of the ideal theory of consent into practice. According to the 
established practice of requiring consent and assessing competence, the concept of moral 
autonomy reoccurs in an ad hoc way when there is no more consent to give. It is called for to 
justify decent treatment of those without the capacity to enact personal autonomy. O’Neill 
puts the concept of moral autonomy back on a level with the concept of personal autonomy, 
seeing both as fundamental principles on which all institutionalised health care should be 
based. 
 
The ethics following from Principled Autonomy are supposed to have an effect on how 
competent patients are treated, supporting trust in individuals and, according to the distinction 
made above, confidence in the institutions. By institutionalising the dictums that can be 
derived from the concept of moral autonomy, we ought to be able to trust that even if the 
practice of informed consent should fail in realising its intended ideals, there is a security net 
in place to ensure proper treatment. Is there anything in this groundwork of bioethics that 
would affect the way individuals who lack the ability to enact their personal autonomy are 
treated? My hypothesis is that a realisation of O’Neill’s suggestion would not leave us with 
any new reasons to trust that we will respectfully be taken care of if we lose our competence 
to make autonomous choices. This is not because of deficiencies of O’Neill’s account. Rather, 
it is because of the way competence is assessed and the practice of delegating discretion to 
surrogate decision-making, which can be show to be in conflict with the idea of respectful 
treatment derived from the concept of moral autonomy. Consequently, it can be argued that 
the established way of treating individuals who lack decision-making competence conflicts 
with both versions of personal and moral autonomy which constitute a democratic welfare 
state. In Article I, I explore why I think this is so. Moreover, when discussing the results of 
the line of reasoning in this article below, I will clarify how the policy I suggest to meet this 
challenge can be considered a substantive realisation of the general framework for delegated 
discretion accounted for above.  
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Fair distribution of health care, accountability and discretionary 
judgments  
 
We saw above that physicians could be considered as street-level bureaucrats with the 
delegated authority to meet individual needs within the public distribution of health care. How 
can these kinds of needs be met fairly by physicians exercising discretionary judgment? 
Furthermore, if we were to be able to trust that they act fairly; what would be required?  
 
Distribution of health care within an organised society involves various levels of decision-
making. First, at a superior level of state constitution, one must agree whether health care is a 
social good that should be distributed fairly by the state (Daniels 1985; Sen 2002). The 
concrete organisation of health care within a state is affected by the priority given to health 
care versus other social goods. In the following, I will assume that health care is considered 
an important social good to be distributed by a democratic welfare state of the type set out in 
the introduction. The level underneath, the macro-level, is the level for public health care 
decisions carried out by government and health authorities. Then there is the meso-level 
where local decisions concerning regional management, hospitals and community services are 
taken. And finally, health care decisions are carried out at the micro-level, which is the 
clinical level where consultations between patient and health care workers take place. With 
regards to resource allocation, these decisions are framed by the decisions at the upper levels. 
However, doctors, especially, have traditionally enjoyed a great amount of discretionary 
freedom (Freidson 1988) This goes in particular for general practitioners who often work 
outside management without the same constraints as in organised care units such as hospitals. 
In addition, their field of practice, primary care, is complex. It often involves considering 
needs based on ambiguous and sometimes composite conditions that have to be untangled in 
order to provide the relevant care. General health care can be characterised as care provided 
under a great amount of uncertainty as it is the first step in disclosing the conditions which, 
together with knowledge about available treatment, determine what health care there actually 
exists a need for. This process of identifying health care needs (including sick notes and 
specialist referral) calls for discretion in a crucial way. Strictly systematic regulation of this 
complex discovery process at a higher level of authority would simply not be aligned with 
effective care. 
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In the following, I will unite the kinds of health care decisions aimed at patient groups or 
populations, whether taken by health authorities or local management, into the category 
‘macro-level decisions’. These decisions are the results of macro-level decision-making which 
here is also taken to include the meso-level. 
 
So, within this structure of organised public health care in a democratic welfare state, doctors, 
and especially general practitioners have traditionally been left with discretionary power to 
decide on individual needs for distributed health care. According to the general framework 
above discussing formal constraints imposed on discretionary judgments of needs, how can 
we specify the needs physicians are to consider for distribution? 
 
Needs versus health care needs  
In general terms, doctors are supposed to identify the patient’s need and then eliminate this 
need by available and acceptable health care. More precisely, the physicians are expected to:  
1) diagnose the patient,  
2) consider treatment which is relevant to the condition  
3) supply this treatment and  
4) finally, evaluate the recovery of the patient  
 
But what is a ‘need’ in this particular context of health? The first step to demarcate this 
concept, is to relate ‘need’ to the specific knowledge and available means physicians have that 
might eliminate or reduce the need, namely knowledge about what kind of health care 
corresponds to different, identified conditions. ‘Need’ in health care, subjected to the clinical 
judgment of physicians, is most conspicuously understood in terms of ‘need for health care’ 
since health care is the remedy the physicians have to meet the ‘need’ with. So, in a clinical 
setting, when is judgment, or more specifically clinical judgment, acquired? 
 
Clinical judgment 
The concept ‘clinical judgment’ is used with different meanings. It seems to have been 
understood as the equivalent to a physician’s ability to know instinctively the right thing to 
do’, and as ‘the state of art’(Eddy 1996, p 323). In contrast to such a ideal, the concept has 
also been presented as a certain way of obtaining knowledge as opposed to evidence-based 
 57 
knowledge (Tanenbaum 1993). Moreover, it also seems to designate the kind of reasoning 
that processes all available evidence and enables the physician to draw conclusions applicable 
to individual patients (Eddy 1996, p 3). This latter sense of ‘clinical judgment’ would be on a 
par with the description above of ‘epistemic discretion’ in that the reasoning process discerns 
right from wrong interventions (Grimen and Molander 2008). However, it is not clear whether 
clinical judgment in this sense exclusively denotes judgment exercised in relation to bio-
technical factors or whether it also involves normative, non-technical considerations in terms 
of social reasons.  
 
The need for health care can be described in terms of a condition-treatment pairing (Hasman, 
Hope et al. 2006). The same relation between condition and treatment can also be laid out as a 
hypothetic imperative for medical actions with curative purpose (Grimen and Molander 
2008): if x (condition x), then y (treatment y). For instance, if someone has been diagnosed 
with appendicitis, then remove it by surgery. However, in a clinical context, this relationship 
can be affected by uncertainty in different ways: 
1) It is clear what x is, but y is unclear, (this describes cases where the diagnosis is easy to 
determine, but there is no obvious standard treatment) 
2) it is unclear what x is, but y is clear (this is cases where diagnosis is hard to identify, but 
the treatment is conventional) 
3) it is unclear what both x and y are (this is typically cases where it is hard to establish what 
exactly is causing the suffering as well as what can be done to alleviate it) 
4) the relation between x and y is unclear (the connection between x and y must be 
empirically justified. Although the connection may be supported by statistics, there is always 
a possibility that y is not the solution to x in this case) 
 
All these kinds of situations call for clinical judgment. In the way presented here, clinical 
judgment is closely related to the bio-technical potential of curative medicine where the 
judgment might be assessed by success or failure in improving the patient’s health. However, 
there are more aspects of judgment involved in considerations about needs for health care 
than what is captured by the curative condition-treatment model a presented here. First, in 
case 2) even though y is clear there might be several treatments known to be effective but 
which might vary with regard to costs and side-effects. Then judgment is called for to decide 
which to offer. Secondly, in the case of preventive medicine, when the condition is clear but 
treatment unclear, judgment is called for to consider risk factors. But before suggesting any 
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kind of intervention, the risk factors must be considered in accordance with expected valuable 
utility in terms of advantages and drawbacks for the patient. Thirdly, the condition-treatment 
model does not capture the judgment involved in the process of diagnosing the condition. This 
aspect of judgment is essential in the work of general practitioners and relates to choices of 
tests and referrals in order to determine the condition-treatment pairing. Fourthly, we could 
have added a fifth category to Grimen and Molander’s list above, namely the alternative 
where both x and y are clear. According to the condition-treatment model, this is probably left 
out because the model assumes it is clear what is wrong with the patient and it is clear what 
would be an effective treatment. An uncomplicated fracture must be plastered. There is no 
need for judgment to state that. But, by leaving this alternative out of the list we miss the 
opportunity of seeing that judgment is needed to determine whether or not a clear-cut pairing 
of condition and treatment really is to be considered a need at all. For instance, in the case of a 
presumed healthy pregnant woman and easily available technology, should examination with 
ultrasound be considered a health care need in spite of there being no signs of complications? 
In this fundamental way, the discretionary judgment of physicians might underdetermine what 
should count as a health care need. Fifthly, individual judgment also cuts across any 
condition-treatment scheme in that it transfers general condition- treatment knowledge to 
particular cases. In doing so they might, (and I add, should), not only consider the bio-
technical functioning in isolation but related to the overall well-being of the patient in 
question. Anything else would conflict with respecting the autonomy based principles of a 
welfare state. This opens up for letting knowledge of personal information about individuals 
affect the considerations about their health care need and adds yet another aspect of value-
based judgment to the need determination.  
 
So even on a condition-treatment model, judgment does not only work to solve uncertainty 
about condition or treatment or both. It also works normatively in the way that value based 
assessments seem intrinsically connected to the whole process of identifying health care 
needs. (And then we have not even looked into the ways paternalistic considerations might 
come on the top of the medical considerations, or how explicit priority setting between several 
different identified health care needs might affect the situation.) I take the term ‘clinical 
judgment’ to include all of these technical and normative aspects of judgment involved in 
determining a need for health care. This is an important point that must be stressed. A too 
narrow interpretation of ‘clinical judgment’ in a technical, objective sense might be misused 
in apparently providing undisputable answers to debateable question about needs. And in 
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particular, it might mask the aspect of fairness purported by any judgments about health care 
needs within democratic welfare states. 
 
Normative contexts of clinical judgment in a democratic welfare state 
Three normative contexts of judgment were recognised above as general constraints imposed 
on discretionary judgment of street-level bureaucrats in democrat welfare states. We must 
consider how the principles of individualisation, reproducibility and equal treatment relate to 
clinical judgment of health care needs. 
 
On a general level, clinical judgment can be seen as working under the principle of 
individualisation since health care must be adapted to the particular situation and condition of 
the individual patient as long as the aim of the care is to make the individual regain his or her 
health. Clinical judgment is called for to consider the bio-technical and by implication also 
non-technical issues, that affect the adequate treatment provided. For the bio-technical issues, 
reproducibility is required with regard to diagnosis. However, as public health care calls for 
equal treatment of cases that are equal in relevant aspects across the population in order to 
treat citizens as moral equals, the non-technical reasons are also subject to the principle of 
reproducibility. Although, as accounted for above, reproducibility of value based judgments 
might be unobtainable, how could public health care be institutionalised in order to meet these 
requirements in the best possible way? To approach this question we will first have to 
consider the overall aim of health care distribution. 
 
Social determinants and the aim of health care distribution 
Remember the three general principles I set out as constituents of a democratic welfare state. 
These were derived from the three versions of autonomy; moral autonomy, personal 
autonomy and political autonomy. The rationale for providing redistribution of certain goods 
with regard to specific needs was based on the moral autonomy concept requiring us to treat 
each other as moral equals in the sense of treating them as ends in themselves. This implies 
obligations to help those who are worse-off, and enable them to realise their personal 
autonomy. 
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On a population level, inequalities in health can be seen as correlating to social factors, or 
social determinants, such as race, gender and socioeconomic status (Marmot 2004). 
Inequalities arise not only between, but also within countries (Donkin 2002; Huisman, Kunst 
et al. 2004; Folkehelseinstituttet 2007). The underlying causes for how socioeconomic 
positions affect health are embedded in complex social and economic structures of society. 
Although the exact causes of health disparity among groups of people are hard to find, the 
correlation between various living and working conditions such as nutrition, stress and 
unemployment have been documented to affect health status (Wilkinson 2003). Although 
such correlations have been a concern in public health research for a long time, the ethical 
issues that arise out of this link between inequality in health, social justice and health equity 
have not been an issue for exploration until recently (Marchand, Wikler et al. 1998; Daniels, 
Kennedy et al. 1999; Anand 2004; Ruger 2004; Daniels 2006). Bioethics has primarily been 
occupied with ethical issues arising in clinical medicine. When bio-ethicists have considered 
issues of justice or equity, the focus has been on access to health care and the general right to 
health care. The field of bioethics should broaden its agenda by addressing the impact of 
social determinants on health and health inequalities (Wikler 1997; Brock 2000). 
 
The acknowledgment of health inequalities should affect what we consider the overall aim of 
just distribution. If health care is considered essential to promote fair equal opportunity for 
normal functioning and therefore essential to the idea of justice, inequalities in health caused 
by social structures and affecting some people’s opportunities for normal functioning, are 
unjust inequalities (Daniels 2007). Not all health inequalities are unjust but those affected by 
social structures are health inequities (Braveman and Gruskin 2003). Health inequities still 
persist despite equal access to health care, so access to health care is only one determinant 
among several (Marmot 2004). Therefore, just health rather than just health care should be 
the overall aim of distribution (Daniels 2007). Acknowledging this aim is to recognise the 
importance of research into the causal pathways of factors affecting our health as well as the 
importance of developing effective strategies to reduce the inequitable health inequalities. 
 
It seems widely agreed that major efforts to reduce health inequity must be directed towards 
‘the causes of the causes’ of the observable inequality (St.meld. nr 20 2006-2007; 
Commission on Social Determinants of Health 2007). Despite the challenge involved in 
identifying how determinants affect the health of individual’s, innovative approaches to 
inequalities in health have been developed in various countries. For example, establishing 
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policy-steering mechanisms, strategies for protecting the health of employees, affecting 
health-related behaviour and improving the quality of care as well as territorial approaches to 
targeting disadvantaged populations (Mackenbach and Bakker 2003). These are all policies 
which aim to alter the conditions for disadvantaged groups in a population perspective. This 
population perspective is also central to recent approaches to developing clinical guidelines 
involving equity concerns (Aldrich, Kemp et al. 2003; Dans, Dans et al. 2007). Such 
guidelines could be an effective means of reducing health disparities by directly aiming the 
care provided. Unfortunately, however, physicians in primary care, that is, general 
practitioners fronting what is usually people’s first access to health care services, adhere to 
guidelines to variable degrees (Carlsen 2007; Rashidian, Eccles et al. 2008). Interestingly, 
there seems to be a gap in the literature with regard to how individual discretionary judgment 
of physicians could or should contribute in a coordinate way to reduce health inequities when 
considering needs for health care. To approach such a suggestion, let us first consider how fair 
allocation of resources can be carried out at an institutional level. 
 
 
Accountability for Reasonableness 
In order to reduce health disparities, we must expect a variety of strategies to be developed at 
institutional level to respond the complex causes of social inequalities. These strategies occur 
as various resource allocations at an institutional level. Broadly defined, ‘priority setting’ is 
considered to be “allocation of resources between competing demands”, and priority setting is 
expected to occur “in every health system at the macro-level (national, provincial), meso-level 
(regional, institutional) and micro-level (clinical programs)” (Kapiriri, Norheim et al. 2007, p 
79).  This definition is broad enough to involve ‘rationing’ defined as “the withholding of 
potentially beneficial health care through financial or organisational features of the health care 
system in question” (Norheim 1999, p 1426). 
 
Priority setting must address the idea of fair distribution. However, because of the burden of 
judgment, we cannot expect reasonable people to agree on principles for fair distribution. 
Moreover, priority settings must also be legitimate, in that those who make the decision are 
considered to have the moral authority needed to decide upon the distribution. According to 
Daniels and Sabin, the question of legitimacy and fairness would most appropriately be posed 
from the perspective of those who are denied treatment when resources are allocated. From 
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their perspective, under what conditions would health plans or public authorities legitimately 
have the moral authority to make limit-setting decisions? And under what conditions would 
they consider the limit-setting decision sufficiently justified as fair? (Daniels and Sabin 2002) 
Daniels and Sabin assume legitimacy and fairness connect to each other as follows: “We may 
reasonably accept an authority as legitimate only if it abides by a procedure or process or 
even substantive constraints such as Constitutional protections, that we consider generally 
fair. If the authority abandons fair procedure, it may lose its legitimacy. Similarly, in contexts 
where an  authority that claims no legitimacy employs a fair procedure, especially, where 
there may be prior disagreement about what counts as a fair outcome, we may not only accept 
the outcome as fair.” (Daniels and Sabin 2002, p 27).  
 
Daniels and Sabin suggest a framework, Accountability for Reasonableness, to ensure that 
priority settings at the institutional level are fair and legitimate. The conditions set out for this 
framework are supposed to be acceptable to all reasonable fair-minded persons. According to 
Daniels, the fair conditions for legitimate outcomes in resource allocations are (Daniels 2007, 
pp 110-111): 
 
1. Publicity Condition: Decisions regarding both direct and indirect limits to meeting 
health needs and their rationales must be publicly accessible. 
 
2. Relevance Condition: The rationales for limit-setting decisions should aim to 
provide a reasonable explanation of how the organization seeks to provide “value for 
money” in meeting the varied health needs of a defined population under reasonable 
resource constraints. Specifically, a rationale will be “reasonable” if it appeals to 
evidence, reasons and principles that are accepted as relevant by (“fair minded”) 
people who are disposed to finding mutually justifiable terms of cooperation. Where 
possible, the relevance of reasons should be vetted by stakeholders in these decisions – 
a constraint easier to implement in public than in private institutions. 
 
3. Revision and Appeals Condition: There must be mechanisms for challenge and 
dispute resolution regarding limit-setting decisions, and, more broadly, opportunities 
for revision and improvement of policies in the light of new evidence or arguments. 
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4. Regulative Condition: There is either voluntary or public regulation of the process 
to ensure that conditions 1–3 are met.  
 
The crucial idea underlying this framework is that fair-minded people will accept that the 
basis of allocation decisions are relevant reasons when health care needs are to be met fairly 
under the constraint of moderate scarcity. The goal for this kind of procedural decision-
making would be to have all relevant information considered, and broadening the range of 
participating fair-minded state-holders would contribute to this aim. However, Daniels and 
Sabin stress that the framework should not be considered a substitute for democratic processes 
enacting the will of the people. Rather, the framework should be taken to facilitate democracy 
in that “[t]he four conditions connect decisions at any institutional level to a broader 
educative and deliberative democratic process” (Daniels 2007, p 111). Let us briefly consider 
how these four conditions might make such a contribution. 
 
Publicity, Relevance, Revision and Regulation 
The Publicity Condition is important in different regards. First, when the decision-making 
authorities are explicit about the reasons and rationales for the priority settings, the 
transparency allows for the demonstration of a consistent and coherent policy in how these 
decisions are carried out. To be more precise, it allows for disclosure of the fact that an 
appropriate justification has taken place and that the relevant reasons for the deliberation are 
linked to the particularity of the case in question. Importantly, publicity in priority setting is 
more likely to meet the formal fairness principle of equality telling us that equal cases are to 
be treated equally and unequal cases differently if there are relevant reasons to justify they 
differ. Publicity makes it easier to go from case to case by judging the same criteria of 
relevancy and thereby strengthening the fairness of distribution across particular cases. 
Second, if citizens are not allowed to see how and why priorities are made, they are prevented 
from enacting their political autonomy by being engaged in social government. 
 
The Relevance Condition echoes Rawls’ account for the reasonable as presented above. The 
rational for a decision is considered reasonable if the reasons the priority setting is based upon 
are the kind of reasons fair-minded people, possessing the moral willingness to seek for 
reasons that would be acceptable, see as relevant. The rational for priority settings must 
involve reasons that stakeholders, such as patients, find relevant in this regard. Accountability 
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for reasonableness thereby involves testing of the reasons for the allocation under resource 
constraints against various views in order to relevant. To involve stake-holders to vet the 
reasons for priority setting is a way to give more credibility to the aim of having all relevant 
reasons considered. Their role should be considered instrumental in scrutinising the relevance 
of the reasons considered. Insofar as their participation improves the accountability of 
reasonableness, the legitimacy of the priority setting is equally enhanced. 
 
The framework requires mechanisms to revise and challenge the decisions. The Revisability 
and Appeals Condition will allow people who were not engaged in the original decision-
making to advance their views by engaging in deliberation after the decision has been made. 
Given the publicity and relevance conditions, people’s challenges might be directed at the 
justification the priority setting was based upon. People are thereby empowered to engage in a 
broader social deliberation about limit-setting in health care.  
 
Finally, the Regulative Condition is part of the framework as it works to ensure that the three 
previous conditions are met. The idea is that those responsible for making allocation decisions 
concerning health care should, by some kind of public regulation, be required to subject 
denials of care to an independent review. 
 
Fair distribution at the micro-level 
Accountability for Reasonableness is designed to be applied on an institutional level. 
Assuming legitimacy and fairness of macro-level decision-making, we must pose the question 
how this can affect micro-level decision-making? As I discussed in the General Framework 
above, the way the distribution is realised at street-level (micro-level) in terms of discretion 
versus constraining rules is also an issue concerning how to promote fairness. What is most 
fair; considering the particular situation of the individual with regard to equity and enacting 
the principle of individualisation based on discretionary judgment, or ensuring equal 
treatment by constraining the room for discretion by requiring adherence to rules? This 
question must be answered when it comes to the issue of inequities in health and efforts that 
can be made in clinical practice to reduce health disparity. Such an approach must involve 
exploration of the relation between macro- and micro-level decision-making in terms of 
equity. If clinical guidelines are based on fair procedures according to Accountability for 
Reasonableness, will the legitimacy attached to such guidelines automatically transfer onto 
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the clinical decisions at micro-level when physicians adhere to the directive of the guideline? 
The implications of this relationship with regard to equity in health care must be considered 
and there is a gap in the literature when it comes to this relationship.  
 
Medical professionalism, trust, confidence and accountability 
We are now left with two important questions: How might discretionary judgment be 
involved in reducing health inequities? How do legitimate guidelines affect the legitimacy of 
clinical judgments? Let us briefly look into how the medical profession imposes norms of 
fairness on their members’ decisions to sustain trust and confidence in the performance of the 
profession and clinicians ability to act fairly. 
 
Sociological literature on professions offers interesting perspectives on regulations of 
individual physician’s discretionary judgment. Considered as a profession, characterised with 
extended powers to control its work autonomously, medicine relies on its members’ 
professionalism to sustain the trustworthiness and confidence in the delegated discretion they 
collectively enjoy (Freidson 1988). What, then, is this medical professionalism? In general, it 
can be considered as the profession’s self-imposed normative regulation of their work defined 
against the background of a social contract between medicine and society (Cruess, Johnston et 
al. 2004). However, rather than defining professionalism, academic works within the 
profession itself seem mainly occupied with presenting the ideals represented by the idea of 
professionalism (Hafferty 2006). Typically, these ideals describe general requirements of care 
based on scientifically well justified knowledge and standards for ethical behaviour towards 
patients, colleagues and authorities. Interestingly, it has quite recently been pointed out two 
different trends in discussions about medical professionalism in this regards (Hafferty 2006). 
The trends seem to be situated within reflections emerging from within the two different 
health care systems in the USA and the UK. Proponents of professionalism in the mainly 
private insurance based health care system in USA emphasise self-reflective activity of 
physicians as crucial in providing good care (Epstein 1999; Coulehan 2005). The national 
health care system in the UK, on the other hand, promotes academic works on 
professionalism that stress the need for public insight and participation in the regulation of 
medicine (Irvine 2001; Irvine 2007).  
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The ideal of American medical professionalism was challenged few years ago for being too 
narrowly defined (Wear and Kuczewski 2004). The authors suggested changes could be made 
in educating medical students into awareness of the corresponding relations between social 
determinants and health. By encouraging this broader perspective on relevant reasons for 
treatment, self-reflection as constituting medical professionalism is radically challenged when 
it is pointed out that clinical health care concerns not only moral standards of patients’ best 
interests but political standards of fair distribution according to social inequalities as well. 
Furthermore, this political turn will also call for clarification of the professions limited 
legitimacy in acting with moral authority in issues concerning social justice. Public 
deliberation is required. Conjoined with the other approach which vindicates the central 
requirement of public accountability imposed on the practices of medical profession, a new 
ideal of medical professionalism might arise. My hypothesis is that such an ideal for 
professional discretion addressing the inequity in health challenge by fair clinical judgments, 
must be based upon a framework for accountability for reasonableness specially designed to 
be applied on the clinical level to ensure legitimacy in clinical judgment. This hypothesis has 
not been paid much, if any, attention in the literature. My preparation and discussion of this 
hypothesis run through three articles which all concern the discretion of clinicians and just 
distribution of health care. My theoretical discussion of this hypothesis will be embedded in a 
practical framework for reasonable clinical judgments. This framework can be considered the 
second substantive realisation of the general meta-regulations imposed on delegated 
discretion within a democratic welfare state. 
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Aims  
Aim of Paper I: Patient autonomy, assessment of competence and 
surrogate decision-making: a call for reasonableness in deciding for 
others 
In this paper, I address some of the shortcomings of established clinical ethics centring on 
personal autonomy and consent and what I label the Doctrine of Respecting Personal 
Autonomy in Health care. I discuss two implications of this doctrine: 1) the practice for 
treatment of patients who are considered to have borderline decision-making competence and, 
2) the practice of surrogate decision-making in general. The aim is to show that because of 
‘structural arbitrariness’ in the whole process of how we assess decision making competence, 
this area is open to disrespectful treatment of individuals and that the practice of surrogate 
decision making may continue this arbitrariness. And I ask what can be done that would give 
us reasons to trust we would receive respectful treatment even if we are judged not competent 
to make our own decisions. 
 
Aim of Paper II: Klinisk Skjønn og Prioriteringer 
In this paper the aims are to consider: Where should the doctors draw the boundaries for their 
responsibility? What type of priority settings are involved in exercising clinical judgment? 
 
Aim of Paper III: Priority setting in health care: On the relation between 
reasonable choices on the micro-level and the macro-level 
In this paper, I aim to discuss the following questions: Given the assumption that guidelines 
purport some kind of legitimacy, how binding is this legitimacy on particular cases potentially 
subjected to the directives?  
What are the conditions that have to be met in order to ensure that individual claims on health 
care are well aligned with an overall concept of fair health care? 
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Aim of Paper IV: Priority setting in health care: A framework for 
reasonable clinical judgments 
In this paper the aim is to clarify the following issue: What would be the criteria for 
reasonable clinical judgments when departing from presumed legitimate guidelines?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69 
PART III: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS: 
 
A method for theoretical bioethics 
Theoretical discussions about the conditions for bioethics can be called theoretical bioethics 
or meta-bioethics. In the following I will consider what a methodology for theoretical 
bioethics might include. Underlying these considerations is the idea that this method must be 
compatible with moral, personal and political autonomy which form the basis of the political 
principles of a democratic welfare state (see part I.) 
 
A crucial pre-requisite, from my point of view, is that any method in theoretical bioethics 
must address what I will call The immanent ethical requirement for consistency in 
institutionalised bioethical policies aimed at the same group of people (The immanence 
requirement). The argument for this requirement is very simple: The overall aim of bioethics 
is to do right. Theoretical bioethics might have implications for policy-making and all policy-
making concerning the same group of people should be based on the recognition that policies 
aimed at promoting some moral good must not work against each other. To impose policies 
that imply conflicting directives would not be a respectful way of treating people as ends in 
themselves. As discussed in section I, this is one of the bearing values of a democratic welfare 
state. Consequently, theoretical bioethics must search for consistency in all institutionalised 
bioethical policies that regulate the same group of people and avoid practices that undermine 
each other. For example, a policy which stresses patients’ right to self-determinacy in health 
care settings could clash with a policy which encourages health care personnel to ensure that 
patients make ‘right’ decisions. There is a need to organise theoretical bioethics so as to avoid 
conflicting policies. So, the demand for consistent policies is itself an ethical concern, 
immanent in ethical practice, and not just a pragmatic requirement imposed upon policies 
from outside the theory and practice of bioethics.  
 
This is a quite modest claim. I stress that there is a call for ‘consistency’ and not ‘coherency’. 
A requirement of coherency would imply that the policies could justify each other. ‘Consistent 
policies’ simply refers to policies which do not work against each other when affecting a 
certain group of people, such as a group of patients, a group of professionals, the group of 
both patient and professionals, or the people within a nation. 
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To find a method for theoretical bioethics, we must address the following questions:  
 
What is a method? 
What are the aims of theoretical bioethics? 
What could be the fixed point(s) for a systematic reflection in theoretical bioethics? 
 
What is a method? 
‘Method’ can be defined as “a systematic procedure, technique, or mode of inquiry employed 
by or proper to a particular discipline or art” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2008).The 
‘technique’ involved in works on theoretical bioethics can most accurately be referred to as 
‘reflection’. This does not, of course, capture the essence of a ‘technique’ considered as a 
systematic procedure. What is needed to make reflection over theoretical bioethical issues a 
systematic procedure?  To organise something systematically, we need fixed points in the 
proceedings. To establish a method for theoretical bioethics, we need to describe some fixed 
points to render the reflection systematic. 
 
The aims of theoretical bioethics 
I take ‘bioethics’ to cover the whole field of ethics that relates to biotechnology, biotechnical 
research, health and medicine. While ‘medical ethics’ also covers all the health and medicine 
related issues, ‘bioethics’ reaches even further and includes environmental issues affected by 
biotechnology. Theoretical approaches and practical approaches to bioethics can be 
distinguished from each other by the aim of the activity. When we are occupied with practical 
bioethics, our primary concern is with reaching solutions to the challenges we are facing. 
When we are working with theoretical bioethics, our primary concern is justifying the 
solutions to general or concrete challenges in the field. In general, I consider the aims of 
theoretical bioethics to be:  
 
1) discussing premises that might be involved in arguments about action-guiding norms or  
particular cases 
2) drawing adequately justified conclusions about action-guiding regulations 
3) sometimes making adequately justified conclusions about concrete cases  
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1) Theoretical bioethics can focus exclusively on the premises that might be involved in 
justifying action-guiding regulations or particular cases. Examples of theoretical issues might 
be; the moral status of embryos, using animals as organ-donors, or the autonomous status of 
patients. Reflections over these issues are typically carried out as conceptual analysis and as 
theories about how the empirical world occurs and theories about how it ideally should be 
constituted. Thus, these theoretical reflections might be both descriptive and normative.  
 
2) When the aim of reflection is to develop justified action-guiding regulations, reflection 
might either concern i) the general theoretical conditions for the regulation, ii) the practical 
challenges of implementing justified and theoretically generalised regulations in a ‘messy’,  
empirical world, or iii) the unintended effects of an implemented regulation. With regards to 
the practical challenges of implementation, the theoretical conclusion and formulation of a 
regulation might specify who is affected by the regulation of actions, what kinds of action the 
regulation involves and how the success of the policy might be evaluated (for instance, the 
policy of promoting patient’s autonomy by requiring consent). Typically, in White Papers and 
law formulations concerning health care, regulations are often vaguely formulated, while local 
institutionalised practice is based on much more specific interpretation. However, if there is 
no rule that explicitly points out who the regulation concerns or how it is supposed to be 
carried out, it is left to the discretion of ‘those in charge’ to figure out how the regulation 
should structure particular contexts. This illustrates a central issue for theoretical bioethics in 
policy-making: We need to consider how the individual judgment of professionals should be 
fostered in order to meet the normative requirements of the health care service adequately. 
 
3) Particular cases may also be subject to theoretical reflections. These may be difficult cases 
where a solution seems hard to justify in terms of the norms or concepts according to which 
similar cases are usually considered. In such cases there might be a call for theoretical 
reflection before a solution is reached. However, such cases will often be subject to 
reconsideration and theoretical reflection after someone has complained about the original 
decision. Moreover, reflecting over concrete examples, real or constructed, can be a good way 
to provide support for ethical theories. 
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Analytical distinctions within theoretical bioethics 
In order to search for fixed points in a method, we need to get a firmer grip on the issues in 
theoretical bioethics. It may be useful to distinguish between an ideal level, an institutional 
level, and an implementation level. The ideal level is the level where the reflections concern 
the ideal conditions for bioethics. This is the level where, for example, conceptual analysis of 
“autonomy” and “need” and theories about “just distributions of health care” are carried out. 
Reflection at this level offers premises for justifying how to deal with particular or general 
ethical issues. The institutional level is the level where the conditions for moving idealised 
theory into the real world are discussed, and policies, methods and frameworks are developed, 
such as the framework for Accountability for Reasonableness (Daniels and Sabin 2002), 
norms for professional ethics, considerations about how to foster good clinical judgment as 
well as methods for analysing and dealing with ethical dilemmas. Finally, there is the 
implementation level where the policies, frameworks and methods are implemented. Whether 
or not these policies actually work according to the intentions, is an empirical matter to be 
considered at this level.  
 
Second, it seems useful to divide the issues of theoretical bioethics into what I will call 
horizontal and vertical reflections. ‘Horizontal reflections’ concern the issues discussed in 
general terms and spelled out as theories, conceptual analysis and principles at the ideal level. 
They might concern general strategies for implementation at the institutionalised level. The 
aims of horizontal reflections are to make conclusions about the ideal conditions for 
promoting ethical behaviour, while ‘vertical reflections’ concern the actual implementation of 
regulative idea in the empirical world. This vertical move from theoretical reflection to 
practice involves taking particular features of the world into account together with the 
theoretical premises. The aim of vertical reflections is both to make conclusions about 
particular theoretical solutions at the institutional level and practical solutions at the 
implementation level. 
 
Fixed point(s) for a systematic reflection in theoretical bioethics 
Given the division of the field of theoretical bioethics into different departments as presented 
above, we must now ask: Is it possible to develop a general method that covers all these 
different levels of theoretical bioethics? In order to approach this problem, we must first 
isolate features of reflections that are shared by both horizontal and vertical reflection. Such 
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features will constitute fixed point(s) for a methodology in theoretical bioethics. I have so far 
presumed that theoretical horizontal reflections constitute the normative premises involved in 
vertical reflections. If this assumption is justified, it is in how theoretical horizontal reflection 
is carried out we should look for fixed point (s) for systematic reflection. Before concluding 
that this is so, I will consider the possibility that normative premises for policies might 
actually be constrained by empirical facts about how the world is at the implementation level. 
 
A three step procedure for implementing regulations 
With regard to vertical reflection, systematic reflection (for a general method) would require a 
fixed structure of priority in how empirical facts and/or normative considerations impose 
constraints on each other. The call for regulation of actions usually emerges out of dilemmas 
rooted in the empirical world. However, to let conclusions about how the world actually is 
affect the conceptions of how it should be would be to commit a logical fallacy. We would be 
logically mistaken to make statements about how the world should be based on descriptive 
statements about how it actually is (Hume 2000). For instance, although there are many 
obstacles in the real world against patients making autonomous choices, we cannot conclude 
that, for this reason, the requirement for patient autonomy in health care should be abandoned. 
This speaks in favour of dividing the process of policy-making into the following three steps. 
First, the bioethical issues in question should be reflected upon in terms of general and 
normative premises on the ideal level leading to a conclusion about how the world ideally 
should be with regards to this issue. This step implies that theoretical concerns are discussed 
apart from particular, arbitrary concerns of the empirical world. Here there is no room for 
pragmatic considerations that adjust the normative considerations in accordance with how the 
world is. The second step is then to discuss how the theoretical conclusions could be 
implemented on the institutional level constituted by general facts about how the world is. 
The third step concerns the actual obedience to the requirement of the proposed regulation at 
the implementation level. In this phase of the process, it might be appropriate to call for 
pragmatic solutions that adjust the normative conclusions into how the empirical word 
actually is. However, this is an issue that must be carefully considered and judged in 
accordance with the particularity of individual cases. This three step procedure for 
implementing policy can be considered a formally fixed procedure pointing out the direction 
of justification within theoretical bioethics aiming towards a practical conclusion.  
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At this point of the account, however, we can conclude that theoretical vertical reflections 
should involve horizontal reflections in order to arrive at a practical solution. 
 
Epistemological conditions 
If we can conclude horizontal reflections with substantive accounts of how the world ideally 
should be, we will have to presume there are normative premises we trust as valid. How do 
we arrive at such premises? How can we assume the validity of certain premises leading 
towards a conclusion about how the world should be regulated? These questions concern the 
epistemological conditions of moral knowledge. Let us briefly consider different accounts for 
how we may arrive at moral knowledge.  
 
Roughly, I will consider three influential ways we can seek justification of practical 
conclusions about how to act. First, general principles might be considered as starting points 
for justifying decisions about what to do. This would be a top-down model for justification 
and the validity of the relevant premises must be assumed as ‘given’, as prima facie obvious 
in a philosophical or religious sense. Alternatively, we can seek justification bottom-up by 
deriving generalisations from particular instances. This view gives priority to practical 
decision-making based on “social agreement and practices, insight-producing novel cases, and 
comparative case analysis as the initial starting points from which to make decisions in 
particular cases and to generalize to norms” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001, p 392). This 
account comprises theories like particularism and casuistry (Toulmin 1981; Jonsen 1991; 
Callahan 2000). There are arguable weaknesses in each of these approaches. Proponents of 
the first approach will have to come up with an account of how the principles got their status 
as ‘given’ or ‘prima facie’. Different principles might conflict in some circumstances and 
because of their lack of specificity; it is often unclear how they are to be applied to individual 
cases. Those vindicating the second approach will meet a major challenge in the critique that 
this approach lacks any standard to criticise practise-based judgments from outside the 
tradition. As a third alternative, we may consider a third approach that integrates both the 
above models in a justifying system which aims towards a reflective equilibrium of coherent 
justification. Such a view is embraced by Rawls and Daniels (Rawls 1971; Rawls 1993; 
Daniels 1996; Daniels 2003) and also Beauchamp and Childress (Beauchamp and Childress, 
2001). In these terms, the validity of a substantive conclusion hinges upon how well the 
judgment coheres with intuitions, background theory and principles derived thereof. In short, 
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this theory stresses how principles and particular reasons may affect each other under the 
constraining requirement of seeking a reflective equilibrium among theories, principles, 
judgment and beliefs that cohere with each other. Although this theory avoids the criticism 
made of the other approaches about moral knowledge, it has for example been challenged for 
being vague about its precise scope. As pointed out by Beauchamp and Childress “[T]he focus 
might be on judgments, on policies, on cases, or on finding moral truth.”(Beauchamp and 
Childress 2001, p 401). 
 
Methods for reflection in theoretical bioethics 
A method for theoretical bioethics will have to reflect on and account for the way we obtain 
moral knowledge and this will constrain the reasoning that constitutes the horizontal 
reflection. This goes for all general theoretical reflection that might end up as normative 
conclusions. Each of the three epistemological approaches considered here could form a basis 
for a method of theoretical reflection on bioethical issues. The principle based account 
represents a deductive way to arrive at moral knowledge. The reflections based on this 
epistemological approach should be structured as a deductive argument with some given, 
normative premises. The bottom-up judgment-based view represents an inductive way to 
obtain moral knowledge. Horizontal reflections would be explicitly based upon particular 
judgments about particular cases. This will structure the theoretical reflection quite 
differently. A conclusion about theories or general principles must, in this case, be supported 
by judgments about concrete examples. The third view, individual, coherent justification 
towards reflective equilibrium requires yet another argumentative structure since conclusions 
about general principles will have to be tested against considered judgments as well as 
theories before they obtain status as valid premises. If we approach a particular issue in 
accordance with these three different argumentative schemas, we might arrive at the same 
substantive conclusion or we might not. This would be an empirical issue to explore. 
 
Distinct methods  
Theoretical bioethics rests on arguments that might be structured in accordance with one of 
the three epistemological theories about moral knowledge presented above. None of these 
theories can be considered as perfect, non-questionable approaches to obtaining moral 
knowledge. Nevertheless, a method for theoretical bioethics must presuppose the endorsement 
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of a specific epistemological theory and the requirement of consistency in the structure of 
argumentation. If the methodological considerations I have outlined so far are justified, we 
can conclude that it is possible to establish various methods for theoretical bioethics which all 
impose equally formal constraints on the theoretical work. These are: i) a choice of an 
epistemological account and ii) the requirement that the argument is structured accordingly. 
Further, from the actual epistemological theory chosen, different substantive constraints on 
reflection can be derived. These constraints can be specified in accordance with each 
particular approach. So here we have a formal requirement on theoretical reflections 
representing a fixed point for a method: 
 
(1) An epistemological theory to form the basis of valid premises (horizontal reflection) 
and to constrain the overall structure of argumentation towards a practical conclusion 
(vertical reflection)  
 
But then we have to ask: Will such fixed reasoning actually be aligned with the immanence 
requirement? I would say not. As long as we cannot argue the ‘truthfulness’ of one 
epistemological approach over the others, one might chose the theoretical basis one finds the 
most convincing and argue accordingly. But then, systematic reflections over bioethical issues 
might be carried out in different ways by different people and there is no superior 
coordinating instance or idea to systematically regulate these reflections in accordance with 
each other. Consequently, consistent policies are not to be expected.  
 
This should tell us that our search for systematic regulation of theoretical bioethics must not 
end here. We need to look further at the conditions for reflection that allow for different 
argumentative approaches to ethics (as we have just seen there might be), but which also 
provide us with further formal constraints. We must take a step backwards and search for a 
method which: 
 
i) includes the objective that reflection involves the whole field of theoretical bioethics 
involved in regulation of a given group of people, and 
 
ii) allows us to consider all distinct reflections as part of an collective, aggregated reflection 
towards consistent normative policies  
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In this way, we might be able to derive new constraints for individual, theoretical works in 
bioethics. Such constraints will, together with 1), add up to a framework of general formal 
requirements for theoretical bioethics, and might therefore be considered a general method for 
theoretical bioethics as these requirements represent fixed points for systematic reflection. 
 
Categories of normative premises 
When we, from now on, consider the individual works on theoretical bioethics, we have to 
stress a distinction between different categories of normative premises involved in bioethics. 
On the one hand, there are the general principles supported by theory and presented as 
universal principles or as derived, more specified principles. On the other hand, normative 
premises might also be constituted by intuitive judgments about a particular state of affairs. 
We must be aware that acting in the empirical world is also regulated by normative concerns 
which do not make claims on distinct theoretical justification. At least, this is so in the 
absence of identified, conflicting concerns. In the real world, common morality is represented 
in the way judgments about different situations are carried out without appeal to any 
theoretical account to support a logical derived conclusion (Beauchamp and Childress 2001). 
Morality understood in these terms might be promoted through cultural, institutionalised 
practices (Beauchamp and Childress 2001). Considered as two different, but not necessarily 
distinct, schemas for justification, theoretical and common morality based conclusions might 
not always coincide when making conclusions about the right thing to do in particular 
contexts. How to deal with this potential gap is a task for theoretical ethics in general and 
theoretical bioethics in particular. However, it is important not to ignore the significance of 
common morality as it is exercised at the implementation level. Although, this kind of 
morality is intuitive in a crucial sense, and not as ‘worked out’ as theoretical horizontal 
reflections, it represents the real test for an implemented policy among those affected by it. 
The common morality of people as the basis for judgment is the basis for recognition that first 
captures inconsistency between policies in everyday life when people experience frustration 
over conflicting directives. Common morality of people is what first triggers revision of 
theoretically elaborated policies (when policies just do not seem right).  
 
Here, procedures should be worked out in order to ensure that The immanence requirement is 
met. Importantly, however this requirement should be met without falling into the trap of 
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constructing new, normative theories based on empirical facts about other conflicting polices. 
Such theories would be insufficiently justified premises to be involved in vertical reflections. 
 
Considerations about the general method 
Testing and revising vertical reflections with regard to both the horizontal reflections involved 
as premises and intuitive judgments about inconsistency between policies, might allow for a 
systematic, but yet dynamic procedure for improving the justification of policies. In fact, the 
required reflections described here have much in common with the theory described by Rawls 
as ‘a collective wide reflective equilibrium’ that searches for coherently justified principles by 
taking more and more related principles, theories and considered judgments of people into a 
collective, politicised reflection with the aim of converging on shared principles for justice by 
overlapping consensus. Moreover, the meta-methodological view of bioethics I have arrived 
at here is similar to a meta-methodology for ethics in general suggested by Norman Daniels 
(Daniels 2003). The view presented here remains neutral with regard to which 
epistemological theory it is right to choose for concrete works on theoretical bioethics, rather 
it opens up for any theory to work as ‘local’ methodologies (including the method of striving 
towards individual, as opposed to collective, reflective equilibrium). Rather than considering 
this a default, I will emphasis that this actually opens up for various, innovative perspectives 
and the possibility of investigating and testing the premises that form the basis of the policies. 
The wide reflective equilibrium searched by individual reflection in order to establish 
justification and credibility of one’s own moral judgments about particular cases, principles 
and theories, can be seen lifted up to a collective aim for everyone working on bioethical 
issues. In this collective goal, reflective equilibrium is sought by striving towards coherency 
between the common morality judgments (intuitions) of those the policies concern, the 
premises for policies (vertical reflections) and theories (horizontal reflection). ‘Coherency’ 
implies that these theoretical reflections and intuitions mutually justify each other.   
 
Thinking about bioethics from this meta-methodological point of view, allows us to see how 
bioethics might be underdetermined by democracy. The conditions of The immanent 
requirement for consistency in policies and the required top-down direction of justification of 
those by normative theory might seem like a dictatorial way of controlling the deliberation by 
disputable premises. However, when we recognise that it is the common morality of people 
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which initiates revisions or allows people to rest happy with policies even though logical 
inconsistency can be pointed out, the moral authority is in the hand of the people the policies 
concern. In order to work as intended (and to avoid bioethical expertise’s hegemony with 
regards to ‘moral truths’) feed-back mechanisms that capture the experience of those affected 
by the policies must be institutionalised. The ‘common morality’ information can be put back 
into the vertical reflections, as empirical reasons affecting the feasibility of a policy, when the 
policy is reconsidered. Such information should affect revision of unwarranted presumptions 
made in theories. This would not directly challenge the requirement of top-down justification 
as vertical conclusions still need justification from a level of higher generality in order to 
avoid absolute relativism in bioethical practice. Could this premise that the meta-methodology 
presented here does not allow for absolute relativism be seriously challenged? As far as I can 
see, a serious objection would have to be presented as a convincing argument telling us why 
bioethics should not be institutionalised in any way. I take it that this how far an argument 
will have to go to undermine The immanent requirement of consistency. I believe it would be 
hard to find such an argument. 
 
However, a challenge arises for this methodology, when we try to regulate bioethics across 
national borders, as for instance, within the European Union, where some practices are 
derived from within the constitution of a country while others are supranational directives. In 
this regard, the theory must be developed to cope with arrangements which sustain both 
national and supranational democratic influences. This is a veritable challenge because 
supranational norms are then imposed on groups of people, who are already subject to and 
formed by distinct sets of norms. How should a supranational policy meet the immanence 
requirement? And what kind of procedure could be established to ensure fairness across the 
views of different nations if a policy needs revision? I take these questions to be issues for 
further research. 
 
General requirements imposed on theoretical works in bioethics 
First we must recognise that the individual approaches must consistently rest on an accepted 
epistemological theory in order to reach what can be considered valid conclusions ( i.e. (1) 
above). Second, in order to avoid policies working against each other, there is a demand for 
consistency between policies regulating the same group of people. This suggests that the 
quality of vertical arguments cannot exclusively be guaranteed by internal logical consistency 
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within a chosen argumentative structure but also depends on whether the concepts involved 
are compatible with the concepts on which overlapping policies are based. Consequently, 
horizontal reflections are formally constrained by the need to strive for clarity about all the 
presumptions ideal concepts rest on. This will facilitate communication between works on 
theoretical issues. Furthermore, this requirement also supports a collective process towards 
refined justification of policies. 
 
This call for analytical quality in theoretical bioethics implies bioethical expertise. This 
demand appears to conflict with the political call for democratic participation and influence 
on policy-making. To allow for democratic influence within policy-making processes in 
bioethics, empirical research on people’s opinions provides premises which can be used in the 
vertical reflection to challenge and revise theoretical premises. Thus, to facilitate the 
democratic influence of those the policy-making concerns, clarity on any normative issues 
potentially at stake within a given topic, emerges as another requirement on works in 
theoretical bioethics. 
 
Requirements for systematic reflection in theoretical works in bioethics 
(1)   consistency in argumentation according to an endorsed epistemology  
(2)  consistency in the conceptual basis for overlapping policies 
                        clarity about all normative presumptions the ideal concepts rest upon 
(3) theoretical support for democratic influence 
                       clarity on any relevant normative issues potentially at stake 
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PART IV: RESULTS 
 
Result of Paper I: Patient autonomy, assessment of competence and 
surrogate decision-making: a call for reasonableness in deciding for 
others 
In this paper, I have discussed how the process of assessing competence following from the 
Doctrine of Respecting Personal Autonomy in Health care must be considered to be 
‘structurally arbitrary’. I have also considered how designating a single surrogate decision-
maker can continue this arbitrariness. I have pointed out that arbitrary treatment cannot be a 
respectful way to care for vulnerable individuals and I have questioned the adequateness of 
the doctrine to deal with this problem. I have suggested a theoretical framework for 
reasonable surrogate decision-making which could be organised to avoid ‘structural 
arbitrariness’ as well. This theoretical framework and its practical implication in terms of 
reasonable surrogate decision-making can be seen to contribute to a more adequate 
understanding of patient autonomy than the established doctrine. This new understanding 
incorporates both personal autonomy and a regulative idea of moral autonomy in terms of 
reasonableness. 
 
 
Result of Paper II: Klinisk Skjønn og Prioriteringer 
This paper was written with the aim of trying to clarify certain perspectives which could help 
us understand fair priority settings in clinical practice. I have argued that good clinical 
judgment must be seen to be related to the fact that the decision-maker has accepted him or 
herself to be morally responsible for securing the particular patient’s interests but also for 
guarding broader societal interests. Moreover, I have accounted for how exercising clinical 
judgment can be considered an experience-based process of accumulated knowledge. Against 
this background I have suggested two remedial actions for priority setting within clinical 
practice: i) I have provided some analytical tools to improve the overview of the ways clinical 
priority settings occur: Reading clinical practice in terms of the distinctions between visible 
and invisible, justified and unjustified, systematic and unique priority settings and the cross-
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connections between these distinctions, may enhance the awareness of the normative 
character inherent in clinical work, ii) I have suggested that discussion groups of clinicians 
and others interested in the topic are established for debating concrete priority setting issues. 
This could be a way for physicians to establish well founded opinions by collective 
deliberation, as well strengthening their confidence in their own clinical judgment, while 
recognising its inherent normative character. 
 
 
Result of Paper III: Priority setting in health care: On the relation between 
reasonable choices on the micro-level and the macro-level 
Drawing upon a distinction between individual and aggregated needs, I have discussed the 
formal conditions for just health care at micro-level assuming that existing guidelines are 
legitimate. I conclude that the presumed legitimacy of macro-decisions cannot be transferred 
to clinical decisions by simply following the recommendations uncritically. If we are aiming 
at just health care, we have to ensure both vertical (unequal treatment justified by relevant 
reasons) and horizontal equity (equal treatment of equal cases) that follows from the formal 
principle of equality. Even if all this is well taken care of at macro-level and clinicians are 
offered legitimate guidelines from a macro-level perspective, clinicians must be left 
discretionary power to consider the vertical equity of individual needs adequately. Because of 
the nature of the individual need, the legitimacy of individual claims must be accounted for 
partly in their own right. In order to provide fair health care, a framework for accountability 
for reasonableness is needed at the clinical level as well. I have suggested a tentative approach 
by pointing out how collective deliberation might support the individual justification of 
reasons not to follow the guidelines. However, such a framework must be thoughtfully 
developed and institutionalised as a supplement to legitimate macro-level decision making. In 
this way, fair health care might be reached when legitimacy emerges out of the interplay of 
reasonable justification from the macro-level above and the micro-level below. 
 
Result of Paper IV: Priority setting in health care: A framework for 
reasonable clinical judgments 
Working from an account of claims on health care and conditions for professional 
performance, I have developed a framework for reasonable clinical priority setting. This 
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framework should be considered a way to meet the challenges of confidence supporting 
accountability to the public combined with a possibility for public influence on what should 
be considered fair reasons in discretionary judgment about health care distribution. The 
framework is provided as a supplement from “below” to the fair macro-level priority setting 
that generates guidelines from “above” for implementation at micro-level. This should be 
considered as a way of securing fair outcomes from the interplay between these two levels of 
decision making. In what has been described as ‘the historical second phase’ of how to deal 
with priority setting in health care (the move from principled based to procedural priority 
setting) I have pointed out an internal conflict. This conflict concerns on the one hand, the 
lack of a common stable unit of a recognised goal of health care and the lack of agreed 
principles for distribution as a normative basis for health care distribution which tells 
clinicians how to weight their different reasons. On the other hand, it concerns the clinician’s 
need for exactly this kind of basis in order to act in a trustworthy fashion as a competent 
professional in each particular case. The framework provided here presupposes the existence 
of organised public debate to support optimally justified individual claims on health care. By 
using this framework, clinicians can solve this conflict. Considered in this way, the 
framework for reasonable clinical decision making might be taken as a step towards a new 
phase of priority setting. This phase should be based on the acknowledged need for securing 
fair distribution in the interplay between macro- and micro-level considerations by 
legitimising procedures on each level, by well organised and continuing public debate and by 
individual clinical judgments based on well justified and principled normative bases. 
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PART V: DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
Methodological concerns 
According to my methodological considerations in Part III, the work presented in the articles 
can be considered as vertical reflections. Vertical reflections are theoretical discussions which 
aim at policy-making based on normative and empirical premises. Three of the articles 
presented here consider the idea of reflective equilibrium. This can be seen as a method for 
establishing well founded beliefs about our recognised principles, theories and judgment in 
general. The concept of reasonableness that underlies the policy solutions I propose hinges on 
the idea of justification towards a wide reflective equilibrium. In my view, to institutionalise 
the procedure of justification in this way might be both a way to bolster against the 
exploitation potentially incompetent persons and a way to achieve fair distribution of 
individual health care. I have made no attempts to challenge this epistemological method 
when I use it as a theoretical premise in my vertical reflection. However, I have adopted this 
methodology by the different ways I have approached the topics of this thesis in the 
introduction and the articles, respectively. The whole argumentative work presented here can 
be read as a search for an individual wide reflective equilibrium by trying to establish 
coherence between intuitions, principles and theory. This is why, in the Preliminary Remarks, 
I explain the importance of reading this Introduction as an integrated part of the thesis. 
 
When I started working on this thesis, I set out to analyse patient autonomy and physicians’ 
judgments within a theoretical context at the level of implementation. My interest in political 
theory then grew proportionally with my realisation of the limitations of this initial 
framework. Gradually I had to expand the theoretical framework to consider where the 
principles justifying my intuitions (‘common morality’) come from. I was more or less forced, 
from my point of departure, to end up linking surrogate decisions and clinical judgments with 
fundamental principles of a democratic welfare state. Most clearly, this can be seen in the 
development of my argument from my first written article about clinical judgment and 
priority setting, Article II, then through Article III and Article IV, and into the Introduction. 
When I now look back on the articles that were produced during this early phase, I could 
perhaps say that I have now reached the point of coherence where I should have started my 
considerations about the particular issues. But then, I might have overlooked some of my 
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primary concerns which were rooted in the intuition-based judgments and considerations I 
started with. Obviously, growing up in a so called Scandinavian welfare state, I can make no 
claim to be able to distance myself from the cultural background my arguments flow from. 
This background has formed both my judgments and the theoretical ideals I find to support 
them. However, I have tried to show how a given set of political and moral ideas of autonomy 
support the initially more narrowly justified intuitions about an inadequate concept of patient 
autonomy and insufficiently justified health care judgments. This argumentative structure 
might be useful for the justification of other policies implemented within a democratic welfare 
state under the claim of promoting justice or respectful treatment of citizens. 
 
The political theory involved here is more or less taken at face value. I make no attempt to 
criticise it. I see it as a further way to broaden my search for reflective equilibrium by 
including a more extended version of Rawls’ theory as well as other theories about justice and 
testing these against each other and against judgments about particular cases. Meanwhile, I 
am left with the articles showing the development of my journey. In the following, I will 
make some comments on the results of these papers.  
 
Requirements for systematic reflection 
I have stated my own choice of the method of reflective equilibrium as the way to reach valid 
knowledge about normative issues. Through this, I have met the requirement of clarity on the 
chosen epistemological method in works on theoretical bioethics set out in the 
Methodological Consideration section (Part III) above. But do my papers also meet the 
requirements for providing consistency in the conceptual basis for overlapping policies and 
theoretical support for democratic influence? In other words; have I been clear about all the 
normative assumptions on which the ideal concepts rest and have I emphasised any relevant 
normative issues potentially at stake by the policies I suggest? 
 
Firstly, by linking my papers to the values of different versions of autonomy underlying a 
democratic welfare state, I have tried to clarify the normative presumptions that this whole 
project rests on. Although, this link was not entirely clear to me when I wrote the articles, I 
now see them as essential in justifying my intuitions, but also in demarcating the framework 
for the validity of the results of the theoretical discussions and the practical solutions. 
Secondly, a result of clarifying these presumptions is to facilitate more targeted criticism. 
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Criticism that hits clearly identified soft spots in theoretical arguments could affect collective 
deliberation on theoretical bioethical issues towards a collectively wide reflective equilibrium. 
Thirdly, inviting targeted critique enhances the likelihood of recognising which normative 
issues one really disagrees about. By unpacking the fundamental values the argument rests on 
I have tried to emphasise what is really at stake with regard to the development of policies in 
a democratic welfare state. Disclosure of underlying political values should be considered 
important to develop and sustain a democracy. In this regard I take it that I have met the 
requirements for systematic reflection in the theoretical bioethical works listed above. 
 
As it is, I do actually suggest two different policies here that are aimed at the same group of 
people, namely inhabitants in a democratic welfare state. This provides me with an 
opportunity to consider one central idea in the general method in more detail. Do the 
suggested policies in this thesis meet the The immanent ethical requirement for consistency in 
institutionalised bioethical policies aimed at the same group of people? Are the policies 
consistent with one another, or does one work against the intentions of the other? By trying to 
map the normative terrain of a certain kind of state, I have provided a background of values to 
test any bioethical policy against to search for consistency among vertical reflections. 
Remember that ‘consistency’, understood in a weak sense, implies that policies are not to 
work against each other, rather than that they are supposed to justify each other internally.  
 
In my paper on patient autonomy, I criticise the established doctrine of patient autonomy 
indirectly on the basis that it does not harmonise well with all the versions of autonomy which 
constitute a democratic welfare state. The policy I suggest instead aims to restore the moral 
background for patient autonomy which has been distorted as a result of undue weight put on 
personal autonomy.  
 
Our obligations to respond to health inequities in the first place, and by means of discretion 
(in combination with priority setting between different goods on an institutional level, as 
Daniels vindicates) can also be justified against the background of social responsibility 
flowing from the concept of moral autonomy. More precisely, social responsibility, or 
solidarity, enacted through discretion, flows from the part of the moral concept that requires 
us to treat people as ends in themselves. By requiring accountability of professional 
discretion, we maintain the other part of the concept of moral autonomy that calls for treating 
people equally in order to respect them as moral equals (when equal in relevant respects). The 
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idea of professionalism works by collectively imposing norms on the individual judgment of 
all the members of the profession. The framework for reasonable clinical judgments I propose 
meets both these requirements. In addition, it promotes personal autonomy by aiming at 
supporting the worst-off with better health and opportunities. And finally, it facilitates 
democracy by empowering citizens with political autonomy to engage in coordinated and 
organised public deliberation about health care issues.  
 
The two distinct bioethical policies I discuss in this thesis share the same basis of values. 
Therefore, the policies I suggest would not be expected to work against each other but rather 
to co-exist on an institutional level in a democratic welfare state. (Although, we cannot 
predict that their intentions will not get twisted somehow in the implantation process causing 
a conflict on the implementation level.) I therefore conclude that when the Introduction and 
the articles are considered together, this work meets the requirements of a general 
methodology in theoretical bioethics. 
 
Patient autonomy and the values of a democratic welfare state 
With regard to competence assessment and surrogate decision-making, I have tried to make it 
clear why moral, personal and political autonomy have not been fully realised in established 
practice. A practice of promoting patient autonomy primarily based on the idea of personal 
autonomy requires a yes or no to the question concerning people’s decision-making 
competence in order to proceed in an ethical manner by either leaving the decisions with the 
patient or calling for a surrogate decision-maker. The procedure according such practice goes 
as follows: first, adults’ competence for making autonomous choices is presumed until others 
find reasons to doubt it: then the competence is judged on a basis of value-laden premises 
about performance and correlating levels of competence, and finally if someone is not 
considered competent, someone else is given the right to make decisions on behalf of the 
incompetent person. In the cases where individuals are judged incompetent, the result of this 
process is not just that the people in question are deprived of their rights to make their own 
decisions. In addition, their corrections of other people’s opinions of their best interests 
cannot consistently be ascribed credibility. By virtue of a competence assessment, these 
individuals are made even more vulnerable to exploitation, coercion and mistreatment 
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compared to people who at least have the moral and political right to be taken seriously when 
they object to some kind of intervention flagged to be in their best interest.  
 
Patient autonomy, in the current context of informed consent, is based on personal autonomy 
with ad hoc calls on obligations derived from the concept of moral autonomy after someone is 
assessed not competent. This policy sustains an idea of patient autonomy that lacks theoretical 
justifications to safeguard vulnerable people from not being treated as ends in themselves 
when their competence is doubted. Moreover, delegating the responsibility for deciding an 
incompetent person’s best interests to one or a few others, formally or informally appointed, 
is not a way to guarantee moral responsibility by ensuring that the vulnerable person is not 
being treated as an end in him- or herself. 
 
Furthermore, when the state takes away someone’s right to enact their personal autonomy by 
appointing someone else to judge in their best interest, it delegates discretionary power to the 
surrogate. This means the surrogate decision-makers have to enact political autonomy since 
bearing such a responsibility on behalf of the state is not to be considered a private matter, but 
the plight of a citizen. When proxies are appointed, this aspect of the role might be blurred by 
the fact that the responsibility of care-taking also emerges out of the private relation between 
the incompetent person and the surrogate(s). However, this means that the judgment is subject 
to the normative contexts of judgment derived from the principles of a democratic welfare 
state. When deciding upon the best treatment for a person lacking competence, the situation 
calls for individualisation of this particular person’s need. The substantive content of 
someone’s best interest would often be constrained by what the state might offer anyone in 
the same situation. For instance in public health care settings, the choices surrogates have will 
usually be limited and the ‘best interest’ assessment thereby partly predefined. Thus, there are 
external limitations to the decisions the principle of individualisation might result in as the 
options are subjected to the principles of fairness. However, in carrying the delegated 
responsibility of making decisions about another person’s best interest, and thereby realising 
the state’s political obligations of caring for the vulnerable, surrogates should also be seen as 
carrying the responsibility for making well justified decisions. On an institutional level, as a 
safeguarding mechanism, the state should be expected to make surrogates accountable for 
their decisions. A democratic welfare state will have to establish procedures or standards to 
account for these decisions in order to maintain confidence in the state’s organisation of 
decision-making for incompetent persons. 
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The practical solution I provide that makes the surrogate accountable in terms of 
reasonableness for the decision can be seen as a substantive realisation of the meta-regulations 
argued in Part I to be inherent in delegated discretion. 
 
O’Neill has clearly pointed out that the policy of requiring consent is based upon too thin a 
concept of patient autonomy, (namely personal autonomy), to bear the field of bioethics. I 
totally agree and support her call for a concept of moral autonomy (or in O’Neill’s 
terminology Principled Autonomy) to fill out the conceptual moral basis for bioethics. While 
O’Neill turns to Kant, I content myself with considering the concept a regulative idea with 
which adequacy is brought to bear on our intuitions. Many, including Beauchamp, Childress, 
Buchanan and Brock have discussed the unstable ground on which assessment of competence 
is carried out. I have tried to clarify this important point by analysing not only the assessment, 
but also the preceding and succeeding events of the assessment process, to show the inherent 
arbitrariness of this whole procedure. As a result I have gone even further than O’Neill in 
criticising the established doctrine. I question the whole structured chain of events, derived 
from the priority put on personal autonomy that creates a suboptimal situation for those with 
unclear competence. My suggestion of a procedure of reasonable justification to protect the 
vulnerable also represents an attempt to reorganise the logically structured practice allowed 
for when the implications of moral autonomy are initially ignored. 
 
Just health care and the values of a democratic welfare state 
Distribution of health care according to needs identified by physicians and put forward as 
claims on behalf of the patients, also challenge the basic values of a democratic welfare state. 
A crucial issue related to fair distribution concerns the organisation of the distribution in 
terms of binding guidelines versus delegated discretion. By relating to the values derived 
from different versions of autonomy, we can sum up the challenges meeting the process of 
institutionalisation and the clinical judgment of the individual physician.  
 
On the institutional level, allowing for discretion versus requiring adherence to rules can be 
seen as the means to meet unfair inequalities (by discretion) and fair equal treatment of equal 
cases (by rules). This is how a trade-off between the political principles flowing from the idea 
of moral autonomy could be institutionalised. On the one hand, treating people as moral 
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equals by considering them as ends in themselves calls for individualisation and reduction in 
unfair constraints on the possibilities for individuals to enact their personal autonomy. On the 
other hand, the equal moral standing of individuals requires equal treatment of equal cases 
since any discrimination would undermine the idea of equal moral worth. If we focus on 
justice, this is how the dilemma of organised health care in terms of discretion or rules looks. 
 
In a parallel ‘quality of care’ perspective, however, discretion versus rules or guidelines is 
about the quality of the care delivered. Leaving room for discretion allows for individual 
adjustments of treatment according to the complexity of individual cases, while requiring 
strict adherence to guidelines would be to promote the most effective, scientifically based care 
across the whole patient population. There does not seem to be much disagreement about the 
need for individual adjustment of care if we focus on ‘quality of care’ since a rule cannot 
allow for composite particular needs. Therefore, discretion is needed to decide particular 
health care needs and clinical guidelines exist as guidelines and not as rules precisely in order 
to allow for the potential complexity of individual cases.  
 
In this thesis, I have tried to argue in favour of discretion also from the perspective of justice 
in order to diminish unfair inequalities in health. In the Introduction, I approached the issue 
from above, stressing the correlation between social determinants and health status of 
populations. My assumption is that these concerns must be met with discretion pretty much by 
the same reasons that run the idea of rule-based ‘quality of care’ into a paradox. Reasons must 
be spotted from case to case since they depend on the contextual settings of composite bio-
technical and social conditions. In my articles, I have explored this issue from below, that is, 
from a micro-level point of view, by testing intuitions about relevant reasons for different 
treatment of bio-technically equal, but socially unequal cases. The argument in favour of 
discretion emerging from these considerations rested on intuitive judgment that there are 
unfair inequalities in people’s living conditions and that these add up to relevant reasons for 
justifying different treatment. By seeing the superior aim of health care as just health rather 
than just health care, I have now also accounted for the political and moral relevance of these 
reasons.  
 
By calling for discretion against this background, I am by no means suggesting that we give 
up the idea of striving for equality in treatment by adherence to guidelines, at least not if these 
guidelines are developed according to fair procedures and can be considered legitimate. 
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Rather, I stress that we need both discretion and legitimate guidelines. In order to depart from 
guidelines, any discretionary judgment should, to be considered legitimate, be accountable 
according to the framework I suggest for reasonable clinical judgments sustained by public 
deliberation. In this way, physicians might meet both the important requirements which stem 
from the idea of treating others as moral equals. If we look at fairness, clinical guidelines 
ensure that equal cases are treated equally with regard to ‘the quality of care’ and cost-
effective rationing, while discretion within the suggested framework ensures that social 
inequalities affecting the way individuals might benefit from health care treatment might be 
compensated for by extra efforts to level up their health, enabling them to pursue their own 
ends and enact their personal autonomy. The public deliberation I see as an intrinsic part of 
the framework, might affect the justification process carried out by the individual physician 
departing from the guidelines and help it move in a direction that also sustains reasonable 
judgments. In this way, physicians can be seen to possess legitimate moral authority to 
determine health care needs against a background of social injustice. The idea of political 
autonomy of physicians working as street-level bureaucrats might be realised. Democracy 
could be facilitated in terms of reasonableness and brought all the way down to the street-
level throughout the organised distribution system of a democratic welfare state. Moreover, 
the idea of organising systematic public deliberation about priority setting in health care could 
also affect the political autonomy of patients, that is, the citizens. Not only will it open up for 
more understanding of the priority-setting processes and political influences of people in 
general on health care decisions. A continuously ongoing, organised public deliberation 
process could also support patients’, or citizens’, understanding and acceptance of fairness 
constraints on health care decisions concerning themselves.  
   
The framework for clinical judgment presented in this thesis encompasses the different 
approaches to individual micro-level judgments discussed in the Introduction. Firstly, the 
meta-regulations derived from the works of Goodin, Grimen, Molander, Rawls and Scanlon 
and imposed on Lipsky’s street-level bureaucrats, can be considered a detailed account of the 
formal conditions involved in fairness standards imposed on discretionary judgement as 
hinted at by Dworkin. I have explored these regulations against the background of a 
democratic welfare state. Although Dworkin has declared himself a ‘resource egalitarian’ as 
opposed to a ‘welfare egalitarian’, he might still agree to the formal conditions represented by 
the principles of equal treatment, reproducibility and individualisation, as well as the 
regulatory levels of justification. He might, however, disagree in how the different principles 
 92 
should be weighted relative to each other when fairness is considered in relation to a certain, 
substantive topic. Secondly, the framework is a response to the theoretical issues of fair 
clinical judgments left open under Daniels and Sabin’s influential work on fair priority setting 
at the macro-level. The general formal constraints of fairness imposed on street-level 
bureaucrats can be seen to be specified into the substantive framework I suggest for the 
particular discretionary judgment exercised by physicians in micro-level distribution. 
 
Clinical judgment 
My arguments for the suggested framework rest heavily on a challenge to the ambiguity of the 
concept ‘clinical judgment’. In the Introduction I have drawn on a model presented by Grimen 
and Molander describing how judgment can be seen to close for uncertainty in reasoning 
processes. Although they discuss clinical judgment according to this model to some extent, 
this is not the particular topic for their more general claims about how judgment is supposed 
to work. This point also goes for Lipsky, Dworkin, Goodin, Rawls and Scanlon as none of 
these, to my knowledge, discuss clinical judgement in particular. I cannot, therefore, conclude 
that any of these theorists would agree with me that clinical judgment of physicians should be 
subject to the general fairness requirements as I have tried to demonstrate.  
 
Nevertheless, I find the thought I have tried to articulate with their help important. When we 
recognise that clinical judgment is normative in an essential way and is already subject to the 
requirements of fairness when exercised within a public health care system, the view that 
justice is some kind of consideration that eventually applies to the clinical setting (for instance 
in terms of cost-effectiveness considerations) is challenged. The view presented here also 
undermines the distinction used to describe the physicians’ role as patient advocates versus 
gate-keepers since they always work under principled constraints of both individualisation 
and equal treatment. Moreover, I argue that clinical judgment should explicitly address issues 
of fairness in order to level up the health of those worse-off because of social injustice. It 
might be that this is actually practised in an implicit manner, but that the reasons for doing so 
are veiled under the heading of acting in the ‘patient’s best interest’. However, physicians 
should not seriously be expected to perform such a task unless this requirement also is 
appropriated reflected in the education of medicines. The curriculum for medical education 
will have to involve courses in social and distributional justice as part of the framework 
supporting physicians with legitimate moral authority to make this kind of decisions.  
 93 
 
Motivation to act upon fair reasons 
Professionalism understood along the lines of the suggested framework does not, however, 
grant the crucial motivation for members of a professions to act according to the merits 
vindicated. At the end of the day, the performance of the physicians hinges on their individual 
motivation. That motivation must somehow accord with their conception of the good (which 
they may well have been socialised to hold). 
 
If this suggestion about institutionalising discretionary power in order to meet just health 
claims is supposed to work, we must also be justified in believing individual street-level 
bureaucrats would be motivated to act according to their awareness of what is needed. 
Theoretically, we must come up with a theory that supports a belief that street-level 
physicians (general practitioners) might be motivated to distribute health care fairly to 
promote just health by allowing for discrimination with regard to relevant non-technical 
reasons.  
  
According to Rawls’ account, a reasonable person would be engaged in institutional decision-
making with the aim of reaching conclusions based on reasons that other people sharing the 
same aim could be expected to find acceptable. In Scanlon’s view, reasonable thinking would 
be constrained by justifying reasons that others affected by the decision, if appropriately 
motivated, could not reasonably reject. Those empowered with discretion within a welfare 
state are responsible for acting to support confidence in the distributive institution they 
represent as well as to support trust based upon the interpersonal relation between street-level 
bureaucrats and their clients. The motivation Scanlon presumes to be included in the idea of 
what we owe each other calls for justification involving consideration of the views of the 
person in front of us. Justification in terms of reasonableness towards particular others 
involving their specific history and situation might imply a different reasonable conclusion 
than the conclusion which flows out of reasonable considerations based on a more abstract 
ideas of fairness which is appropriate for institutions and policies for aggregated populations. 
This seems to be an inherent tension in the whole idea of reasonableness.  
 
At the same time Scanlon’s theory might clarify physicians’ desire to ‘act as their patients’ 
advocates’ in cases of moderate scarcity. It might also be part of an explanation of the fact 
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that general practitioners follow guidelines to a very varied extent. According to the suggested 
framework, however, we should note the following: If Scanlon is right about his theory, and if 
physicians are properly educated with regard to the empirical knowledge of social 
determinants as well as theories about social and distributional justice, we have reason to be 
optimistic about physicians’ motivation to distribute health care fairly by discretion when 
facing health inequity. 
 
Legitimacy 
The framework for reasonable clinical judgments is not derived from Daniels and Sabin’s 
framework Accountability for Reasonableness, but it share the same premises about burden of 
reasons, Rawls idea of the reasonable and justice in terms of fairness. Moreover, the 
framework Accountability for Reasonableness has played a crucial role in this argument as a 
guarantee for the potentiality for legitimate clinical guidelines. My account for fair clinical 
judgments is equally, or even more, vulnerable to critics as the Accountability for 
Reasonableness framework by the claim on legitimacy. What is involved in the ‘legitimacy’ 
these frameworks purport when they can at most claim to facilitate, not realise, democracy? 
This question has not been fully answered and it points to an important discussion that ought 
to be carried out if we were to implement the frameworks in democratic welfare states. 
 
However, based on Scanlon’s theory, we could argue in favour of the clinician’s moral 
authority to make legitimate decisions. In so far the clinician responds to the call of morality 
wrapped up in the concept of ‘what we owe to each other’, he or she possess the certain 
perspective on the situation that might correct for the lack of attentiveness to ethical, 
justifiable nuances that come with the dictates of principles when presented in guidelines.  
 
Reasonableness as an institutionalised justification process 
My suggestion for how an institutionalised justification process could be carried out both with 
regard to surrogate decision-making on behalf of incompetent individuals and physicians’ just 
health care claims, involves the idea of reasonableness. These topics call for reasonableness 
for different reasons. Nevertheless, the reasonableness called for can in both cases be related 
to the formal frames of normative contexts of judgment and the levels of justifications 
presented above. First, with regard to the process of surrogate decision-making preceded by 
 95 
formal or informal assessment of competence, reasonable discretionary decision-making is 
seen to emerge out of a process of collective deliberation about the particular case in question. 
Pressing the level of justification of all reasons for a certain decision into collective 
deliberation within a composite group of people can be seen primarily as a means of 
safeguarding against exploitation, misuse or simply indifferent treatment of potentially 
incompetent or obviously incompetent persons. In this regard, the collective search for 
reasonable reasons in deciding for others is a response to the regulative idea derived from 
moral autonomy requiring that we treat others as ends in themselves. 
 
With regard to physicians’ claims to health care on behalf of their patients, reasonable 
discretionary decision-making when departing from the guidelines is supposed to emerge out 
of physicians’ reflection and justification of reasons in combination with a parallel, ongoing 
public debate about reasons that justify discrimination in treatment and the goal of health care. 
The search for reasonable reasons is both about ensuring equal treatment based on the same 
relevant reasons when allowing for discretion in interpretations of need, but it is also about 
public influence on the reasons which underlie the actual distribution of a common good, 
health care. In this manner it can be considered to have the effect of tightening what was 
called the ‘black hole of democracy’. 
 
For both topics the solution involves forcing reasonableness in decision-making by 
institutionalising a process of justification. This is not primarily because of suspicions that 
people do not care about how their decisions are justified. Rather, the benefits gained by 
appropriate justification in these cases are too valuable in a democratic welfare state to be left 
as a matter of contingency depending on whether those delegated with decision-making 
authority are motivated accordingly or not.  
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Further research 
My theoretical solutions to the topics explored in this thesis point out several potential 
directions for further theoretical and empirical research. I will sum up the most important ones 
in the following. 
 
The discussions in the articles are what I have referred to as vertical reflections. As they 
primarily concern issues about institutionalisation, they are not attempts to provide accounts 
for concrete implementation. Consequently, there is much more to discuss about the 
feasibility of the suggestions but that goes beyond the aim of my discussions. Given the 
normative character of this study, it is my intention to reflect over and point out reasons for 
structural organisation. According to the methodological considerations I have presented, the 
next step would be to consider the practical challenges of implementing the suggestions 
provided here. This goes for both the topics.  
 
Firstly, regarding surrogate decision-making, specifying the particular conditions needed to 
ensure the reasonable outcome of the process of collective deliberation is still to be worked 
out in further detail. I have mainly pointed out the general direction of the work needed. 
Moreover, discussion is needed on how the deliberating process described here would be 
aligned with the work carried out by clinical committees already established within hospitals 
in many countries. 
 
Secondly, it is important to make empirical investigations of how street-level bureaucrats are 
actually motivated when they make claims on resources on behalf of their clients or patients. 
It seems to me that analysing how street-level bureaucrats are subjected to expectations of 
reasonableness would be a fruitful path to learn more about the ideal characteristics of the 
individuals who distribute the goods of the society. Theoretically, there is tension between the 
direction of justification of reasonable claims when enacting political autonomy from an 
aggregated point of view and reasonable claims when enacting moral autonomy from within a 
context of a particular individual. This appears to me to be a promising starting point for 
understanding the motivational forces at play when just distribution is to be ensured in the 
 97 
face of particular individuals with their particular needs. However, a more detailed analysis of 
the views of Rawls and Scanlon than the one presented here would be required.  
 
Thirdly, there is a need for empirical investigation of the effects of social determinants on 
physicians’ judgment about particular health care needs, or more precisely; the effects of 
equity reasons on health care decisions. Do physicians actually incorporate such reasons when 
considering health care needs? Moreover, a hypothesis that these kinds of reasons actually 
work against the implementation of clinical guidelines should be tested to provide useful 
information for those developing guidelines. 
 
Fourthly, partly connected to the point made above, the approach to reasonable claims on 
health care provided in this thesis could also provide a theoretical basis for innovative 
empirical research design. A theoretical concept of a decision oriented street-level bureaucrat 
could be modelled according to the normative context of judgment settled by the institution a 
street-level bureaucrat is supposed to realise on the one hand and the various levels of 
justification according to which he or she might justify his or her judgments as best calculated 
on the other. Empirical surveys could be designed to see what kinds of reasons street-level 
bureaucrats actually respond to in given hypothetical contexts (while recognising that this will 
not necessarily the same they would decide in a real context). In the case of health care 
workers, the contexts could be presented with minor changes representing bio-technical, 
social and cost-effectiveness conditions so as to make it possible pick up on the reasons that 
make a difference in the street-level bureaucrat’s idea of a need for health care. The results of 
such a survey could bring valuable information about the way of justified reasonableness 
constitutes motivation in health care workers. This might be useful knowledge which might 
partly explain the variation in adherence to clinical guidelines. And equally important, this 
would also be a way to pick up on and clarify the kind of reasons street-level bureaucrats are 
moved by and subject these to public scrutiny in order to test their level of justified 
reasonableness (and legitimacy) empirically. This would be a way to open up for democratic 
influence upon the individual, discretionary judgment of street-level bureaucrats, as described 
in article IV. A fully developed democracy must be expected to allow for criticism and 
challenge of established practice from those whom the practices concern. 
 
From the point of view of justice, the appropriateness of my suggestions to institutionalised 
surrogate-decision-making and just distribution of individual health care depends heavily on 
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the justification of the method of reflective equilibrium. This is not mainly a question about 
whether humans actually reason in the way the method suggests. Rather, it is a question of 
whether the method is sufficiently justified to play the role it is assigned to. Do we reach 
adequately justified beliefs about the appropriate institutions by arguing according this 
method? This is an issue for further theoretical research. 
 
There are, of course, several theoretical issues waiting to be explored. When I have discussed 
the relation between micro- and macro level decision-making, I have presupposed the 
legitimacy of clinical guidelines. This assumption must be challenged. Because of the 
different contexts of justification at work at the different levels of decision-making within a 
state, concepts of legitimacy could be elaborated at each distinct level in order to avoid 
fallacies when applying the results of fair procedures at one level directly on to decisions at 
another level.  
 
The interpretation of clinical judgment involved in this thesis as it is exercised within a public 
health care system challenges the view that an adequate understanding of clinical judgment 
represents value neutral knowledge about bio-technical concerns when determining particular 
health care needs. A profound analysis of how clinical judgment works through the whole 
procedure of 1) diagnosing the patient, 2) considering treatment relevant to the condition, 3) 
supplying the treatment and 4) evaluating the recovery of the patient, is based upon various 
kinds of value assessment and should be systematically worked out in order to obtain 
theoretical and political transparency of the highly important distributive work of physicians. 
 
 
Finally, I have tried to demonstrate the political implications of theoretical bioethics as input 
in the development of policies. I take it that there is a need to elaborate more on the 
constraints and implications of the methodological consideration of theoretical bioethics 
discussed here. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
This thesis has centred on two topics; surrogate decision-making for individuals assessed non-
competent to make their own decisions and fair distribution of health care at the clinical level 
of decision-making. The papers included in this dissertation lead towards two separate 
frameworks that suggest substantial changes to current practice in order to avoid exploitation 
of vulnerable individuals and to ensure fairness in the micro-level distribution of health care. 
Independently of the arguments offered in the articles, I have approached the same topics by 
considering the normative meta-regulations inherent in delegated discretion. Against a 
background of values central to a democratic welfare state, these meta-regulations add up to a 
general framework for good discretionary judgment applicable to anyone acting as surrogate 
decision-makers or as street-level bureaucrats aiming at fair distribution of social goods. The 
two substantive frameworks I suggest concerning respectful decision-making on behalf of 
individuals lacking or with reduced competence on the one hand and reasonable clinical 
judgments on the other, were exposed as realisations of the general conditions inherent in 
delegated discretion. I do acknowledge that the distinct intuition and principle based 
approaches have been affected by the fact that I grew up in a ‘democratic welfare’ state and 
that this has formed my common morality and affected my normative reasoning. 
Nevertheless, I take the mutual confirmation of the two distinct argumentative approaches, 
bottom-up and top-down, to speak in favour of two normatively robust frameworks. The 
frameworks might provide a basis for policies to improve and develop democratic welfare 
states. 
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